“We oppose ALL subsidies, whether existing or proposed, including programs that benefit us, which are principally those that are embedded in our economy, such as mandates,” wrote Philip Ellender, president Koch’s government affairs division, in a Wednesday letter to members of Congress.
Ellender singled out the wind production tax credit as particularly deleterious. But unlike that provision, some of the tax breaks included in the House package benefit activities in which Koch and its subsidiaries are heavily invested.
Koch subsidiary George Pacific, for instance, qualifies for a tax break for the production of cellulosic biofuels. Another subsidiary, Flint Hills Resources, operates biofuel production facilities that could benefit from another of the provisions.
Those tax breaks could improve Koch’s bottom line, but the company sees federal tax preferences in general as economically harmful.
“Koch doesn’t view these as ‘benefits’ even if they are in industries we’re in,” explained a source familiar with the company’s public affairs strategy. “They are wasteful and market distorting, and allow other firms to run businesses that aren’t making money any other way.”
Posts tagged ‘economy’
I would characterize long-term Japanese economic policy this way:
- Technocratically planned economy where the government chose winners and losers and directed capital to industries favored for development (e.g. MITI with steel, autos, electronics).
- Strong government favoritism for exports and exporters over the domestic economy -- export industries are heavily protected at the cost of raising costs for internal consumers and limiting competition in domestic markets.
- Enormous, near Herculean commitment to deficit spending as stimulus. With deficits consistently running in the 8% of GP range and total government debt a stratospheric levels, Japan is the poster child for Krugman's anti-austerity
To these three I would add something that is seldom mentioned, that Japan has a near Scandinavian GINI index, with income inequality well under that of the US. Oh yes, and they were an enthusiastic adopter of CO2 limits.
And the result of all this has been... 25 years of stagnation.
I remember when every one of these three planks was enthusiastically lauded by the US elite. I was at Harvard Business School in the late 1980's and much of the discussion was about the US needing to adopt MITI-like government industrial planning and management. If pressed at the time, people might kind of sort of acknowledge that life wasn't so good for Japanese consumers, but we were in a Michael Porter big picture competitiveness-of-nations phase, and no one seemed to care that their definition of national success did not turn out so well for the people actually living there.
To me, Japan is a giant case study in Austrian economics. It's like they set out to run a quarter-century test: "let's see if mispricing of credit and forced misallocation of capital is really the cause of recessions." So it is amazing that no one seems to want to acknowledge the results of this experiment. Paul Krugman appears weekly in the New York Times to frequently advocate for exactly this same economic plan.
A couple of quick thoughts on this map from this Vox article edited by Matt Yglesias
- I hate to diss my old cohorts at McKinsey, but isn't this entirely arbitrary to how you draw the map? If you made the map break in, say, the Atlantic Ocean with the Ivory Coast on the far left of the map and Newfoundland on the far right, won't this look different?
- People seem to want to get freaked out about China passing the US in terms of the size of its economy. But in the history of Civilization there have probably been barely 200 years in the last 4000 that China hasn't been the largest economy in the world. It probably only lost that title in the early 19th century and is just now getting it back. We are in some senses ending an unusual period, not starting one.
Paul Roberts has an editorial in the LA Times that sortof, kindof mirrors my post the other day that observed that corporate stock buybacks (and investments to reduce tax rates) were likely signs of a bad investment climate. Until he starts talking about solutions
Roberts begins in a similar manner
Here's a depressing statistic: Last year, U.S. companies spent a whopping $598 billion — not to develop new technologies, open new markets or to hire new workers but to buy up their own shares. By removing shares from circulation, companies made remaining shares pricier, thus creating the impression of a healthier business without the risks of actual business activity.
Share buybacks aren't illegal, and, to be fair, they make sense when companies truly don't have something better to reinvest their profits in. But U.S. companies do have something better: They could be reinvesting in the U.S. economy in ways that spur growth and generate jobs. The fact that they're not explains a lot about the weakness of the job market and the sliding prospects of the American middle class.
I suppose I would dispute him in his implication that there is something unseemly about buybacks. They are actually a great mechanism for economic efficiency. If companies do not have good investment prospects, we WANT them returning the cash to their shareholders, rather than doing things like the boneheaded diversification of the 1960's and 1970's (that made investment bankers so rich unwinding in the 1980's). That way, individuals can redeploy capital in more promising places. The lack of investment opportunities and return of capital to shareholders is a bad sign for investment prospects of large companies, but it is not at all a bad sign for the ethics of corporate management. I would argue this is the most ethical possible thing for corporations to do if they honestly do not feel they have a productive use for their cash.
The bigger story here is what might be called the Great Narrowing of the Corporate Mind: the growing willingness by business to pursue an agenda separate from, and even entirely at odds with, the broader goals of society. We saw this before the 2008 crash, when top U.S. banks used dodgy financial tools to score quick profits while shoving the risk onto taxpayers. We're seeing it again as U.S. companies reincorporate overseas to avoid paying U.S. taxes. This narrow mind-set is also evident in the way companies slash spending, not just on staffing but also on socially essential activities, such as long-term research or maintenance, to hit earnings targets and to keep share prices up....
It wasn't always like this. From the 1920s to the early 1970s, American business was far more in step with the larger social enterprise. Corporations were just as hungry for profits, but more of those profits were reinvested in new plants, new technologies and new, better-trained workers — "assets" whose returns benefited not only corporations but the broader society.
Yes, much of that corporate oblige was coerced: After the excesses of the Roaring '20s, regulators kept a rein on business, even as powerful unions exploited tight labor markets to win concessions. But companies also saw that investing in workers, communities and other stakeholders was key to sustainable profits. That such enlightened corporate self-interest corresponds with the long postwar period of broadly based prosperity is hardly a coincidence....
Without a more socially engaged corporate culture, the U.S. economy will continue to lose the capacity to generate long-term prosperity, compete globally or solve complicated economic challenges, such as climate change. We need to restore a broader sense of the corporation as a social citizen — no less focused on profit but far more cognizant of the fact that, in an interconnected economic world, there is no such thing as narrow self-interest.
There is so much crap here it is hard to know where to start. Since I work for a living rather than write editorials, I will just pound out some quick thoughts
- As is so typical with Leftist nostalgia for the 1950's, his view is entirely focused on large corporations. But the innovation model has changed in a lot of industries. Small companies and entrepreneurs are doing innovation, then get bought by large corporations with access to markets and capital needed to expanded (the drug industry increasingly works this way). Corporate buybacks return capital to the hands of individuals and potential entrepreneurs and funding angels.
- But the Left is working hard to kill innovation and entrepreneurship and solidify the position of large corporations. Large corporations increasingly have the scale to manage regulatory compliance that chokes smaller companies. And for areas that Mr. Roberts mentions, like climate and green energy, the government manages that whole sector as a crony enterprise, giving capital to political donors and people who can afford lobbyists and ignoring everyone else. "Socially engaged" investing is nearly always managed like this, as cronyism where the politician you held a fundraiser for is more important than your technology or business plan. *cough* Solyndra *cough*
- One enormous reason that companies are buying back their own stock is the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing program, which I would bet anything Mr. Roberts fully supports. This program concentrates capital in the hands of a few large banks and corporations, and encourages low-risk financial investments of capital over operational investments
- All those "Social engagement" folks on the Left seem to spend more time stopping investment rather than encouraging it. They fight tooth and nail the single most productive investment area in the US right now (fracking), they fight new construction in many places (e.g. most all places in California), they fight for workers in entrenched competitors against new business models like Lyft and Uber, they fight every urban Wal-Mart that attempts to get built. I would argue one large reason for the lack of operational investment is that the Left blocks and/or makes more expensive the investments corporations want to make, offering for alternatives only crap like green energy which doesn't work as an investment unless it is subsidized and you can't count on the subsidies unless you held an Obama fundraiser lately.
- If corporations make bad investments and tick off their workers and do all the things he suggests, they get run out of business. And incredibly, he even acknowledges this: "And here is the paradox. Companies are so obsessed with short-term performance that they are undermining their long-term self-interest. Employees have been demoralized by constant cutbacks. Investment in equipment upgrades, worker training and research — all essential to long-term profitability and competitiveness — is falling." So fine, the problem corrects itself over time.
- He even acknowledges that corporations that are following his preferred investment strategy exist and are prospering -- he points to Google. Google is a great example of exactly what he is missing. Search engines and Internet functionality that Google thrives on were not developed in corporate R&D departments. I don't get how he can write so fondly about Google and simultaneously write that he wishes, say, US Steel, were investing more in R&D. I would think having dinosaur corporations eschew trying to invest in these new areas, and having them return the money to their shareholders, and then having those individuals invest the money in startups like Google would be a good thing. But like many Leftists he just can't get around the 1950's model. At the end of the day, entrepreneurship is too chaotic -- the Left wants large corporations that it can easily see and control.
Scott Sumner is actually discussing discrimination, and how discrimination is often "proven" in social studies
The economy operates in very subtle ways, and often when I read academic studies of issues like discrimination, the techniques seem incredibly naive to me. They might put in all the attributes of male and female labor productivity they can think of, and then simply assume than any unexplained residual must be due to "discrimination." And they do this in cases where there is no obvious reason to assume discrimination. It would be like a scientist assuming that magicians created a white rabbit out of thin air, at the snap of their fingers, because they can't think of any other explanation of how it got into the black hat!
Most alarming climate forecasts are based on the period from 1978 to 1998. During this 20 year period world temperatures rose about a half degree C. People may say they are talking about temperature increases since 1950, but most if not all of those increases occurred from 1978-1998. Temperatures were mostly flat or down before and since.
A key, if not the key, argument for CO2-driven catastrophic warming that is based on actual historic data (rather than on theory or models) is that temperatures rose in this 20 year period farther and faster than would be possible by any natural causes, and thus must have been driven by man-made CO2. Essentially what scientists said was, "we have considered every possible natural cause of warming that we can think of, and these are not enough to cause this warming, so the warming must be unnatural." I was struck just how similar this process was to what Mr. Sumner describes. Most skeptics, by the way, agree that some of this warming may have been driven by manmade CO2 but at the same time argue that there were many potential natural effects (e.g. ocean cycles) that were not considered in this original analysis.
I don't think readers will be surprised to learn that I don't have any particular moral problem with tax inversions, reverse acquisitions that allow companies to take advantage of lower foreign tax rates. The US has perhaps the most costly and unwieldy tax code in the world, made worse by our unique insistence on double taxation of foreign earnings that prevents companies like Apple from repatriating billions of dollars. My tax plan begins with the elimination of corporate income taxes altogether, not only as an efficiency and growth step but as a huge step in fighting cronyism.
So I certainly don't share all this creepy Leftist desire for loyalty oaths and such from corporations. But I do have a concern about the economy. Over the past couple of years, it appears that a lot of corporate borrowing has been to:
- Buy back their own stock
- Reduce their tax rate, in part through inversions (apparently over 2/3 of 2014 M&A volume is inversions)
When the two best investments a company can find are in its own stock and in reducing tax rates, then there appears to be a problem with the underlying universe of investment opportunities.
Actually, the best investment our company has found this year is in closing operations in California and escaping that regulatory and litigation mess.
Back in April of 2013 I wrote about how Obamacare was increasing incentives for offering part-time rather than full-time work. I warned at the time that once employers got used to scheduling based on part-time shifts, they might never want to go back because it could actually be cheaper and easier than using full-time workers
The service industry generally does not operate 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, so its labor needs do not match traditional full-time shifts. Those of us who run service companies already have to piece together multiple employees and shifts to cover our operating hours. In this environment, there is no reason one can’t stitch together employees making 29 hours a week (that don’t have to be given expensive health care policies) nearly as easily as one can stitch together 40 hours a week employees. In fact, it can be easier — a store that needs to cover 10AM to 9PM can cover with two 5.5 hour a day employees. If they work 5 days a week, that is 27.5 hours a week, safely part-time. Three people working such hours with staggered days off can cover the store’s hours for 7 days.
Based on the numbers above, a store might actually prefer to only have sub-30 hour shifts, but may have, until recently, provided full-time 40 hours work because good employees expect it and other employers were offering it. In other words, they had to offer full-time work because competition in the labor market demanded it. But if everyone in the service business stops offering full-time work, the competitive pressure to offer anything but part-time jobs will be gone. The service business may never go back.
The future American service worker will likely be faced with stitching together multiple part-time shifts. Companies may partner to coordinate shifts so that workers split time between the companies, and third-party clearing houses may emerge in a new value-added role of helping employers and employees stitch together part-time shifts.
The worst thing about being on jury duty isn’t actually serving on a jury. It’s having to check in every day -- possibly several times a day, depending on your local system -- to see whether you’ll be needed. You can’t plan either your work or your personal life. Your schedule is unpredictable and completely out of your control.
For many part-time workers in the post-crash economy, life has become like endless jury duty. Scheduling software now lets employers constantly optimize who’s working, better balancing labor costs and likely demand. The process demands enormous flexibilityfrom part-time workers, sometimes requiring them to be on call all the time without knowing when they’ll work or how much they’ll earn. That puts the kibosh on the age-old strategy of working two or more part-time jobs to make ends meet. As my colleague Megan McArdle writes, “No matter how hard you are willing to work, stringing together anything approaching a minimum income becomes impossible.”
OBAMANOMICS IN ACTION: Typical US Household Worth One-Third Less Than Under Bush
Seriously? The bursting of the housing bubble, which actually began under Bush, is Obama's fault? Because that is what likely drove middle class household worth down (while the Fed-sponsored asset boom in financial instruments drove up wealth of the top 1%). I suppose one could say that the Republicans sponsored a bubble that helped the middle class while Obama is sponsoring a bubble that helps the wealthy.
I won't say this stuff is meaningless to the economy, because clearly they affect people's perception of wealth and thus spending and optimism. But sound long-term economic growth has got to come from stable and rational monetary policy that allows interest rates and financial assets to find their correct level. Getting political mileage out of bubble pricing of assets only creates incentives for politicians such that they will never stop fiddling with interest rates and credit.
This is a re-post of an article I wrote in 2012. I am re-posting it to demonstrate that recent stories about doctor shortages and wait times are absolutely inevitable results of government interventions in the health care economy.
My son is in Freshman econ 101, and so I have been posting him some supply and demand curve examples. Here is one for health care. The question at hand: Does government regulation including Obamacare increase access to health care? Certainly it increases access to health care insurance, but does it increase access to actual doctors? We will look at three major interventions.
The first and oldest is the imposition of strong, time-consuming, and costly professional licensing requirements for doctors. At this point we are not arguing whether this is a good or bad thing, just portraying its inevitable effects on the supply and demand for doctors.
I don't think this requires much discussion. For any given price for doctor services, the quantity of doctor hours available is certainly going to increase as the barriers to entry to the profession are raised.
The second intervention is actually a set of interventions, the range of interventions that have encouraged single-payer low-deductible health insurance and have provided subsidies for this insurance. These interventions include historic tax preferences for employer-paid employee health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, the subsidies in Obamacare as well as the rules in Obamacare that discourage high-deductible policies and require that everyone buy insurance rather than pay as they go. The result is a shift in the demand curve to the right, along with a shift to a more vertical demand curve (meaning people are more price-insensitive, since a third-party is paying).
The result is a substantial rise in prices, as we have seen over the last 30 years as health care prices have risen far faster than inflation
As the government pays more and more of the health care bills, this price rise leads to unsustainably high spending levels, so the government institutes price controls. Medicare has price controls (the famous "doc fix" is related to these) and Obamacare promises many more. This leads to huge doctor shortages, queues, waiting lists, etc. Exactly what we see in other state-run health care systems. The graph below posits a price cap that forces prices back to the free market rate.
So, is this better access to health care?
I know that Obamacare proponents claim that top-down government operation is going to reap all kinds of savings, thus shifting the supply curve to the right. Since this has pretty much never happened in the whole history of government operations, I discount the claim. When pressed for specifics, the ideas typically boil down to price or demand controls. Price controls we discussed. Demand controls are of the sort like "you can't get a transplant if you are over 70" or "we won't approve cancer treatments that only promise a year more life."
Most of these do not affect the chart above, since it is for doctor services and most of these cost control ideas are usually doctor intensive - more doctor time to have fewer tests, operations, drugs. But even if we expanded the viewpoint to be for all health care, it is yet to be demonstrated that the American public will even accept these restrictions. The very first one out of the box, a proposal to have fewer mamographies for women under a certain age, was abandoned in a firestorm of opposition from women's groups. In all likelihood, there will be some mish-mash of demand restrictions, determined less by science and by who (users and providers) have the best lobbying organizations.
Update: Pondering on this, it may be that professional licensing also makes the supply curve steeper. It depends on how doctors think about sunk cost.
I often criticize others for attributing 100% of any bad trend to their personal pet peeve. To some extent I am guilty of that in my last post, where I blamed declining business formation on increasingly complex regulation and licensing. I think there are good reasons for doing so -- I have spent the last 6 months passing up on business growth opportunities because I was too consumed with catching up on regulatory compliance minutia, particularly in California. And I have watched as many of my smaller competitors who have fewer resources to dedicate to such compliance issues have left the business, telling me they could no longer keep up with all the requirements.
But there is seldom just one single cause for any trend in a complex, chaotic system (e.g. climate, but economics as well). One other reason business formation may have dropped is the crash of the housing market and specifically in the equity many have in their homes.
Home equity has historically been an important source of capital for small business formation. My first large investment in my company was funded with a loan that was secured by the equity in my home. What outsiders may not realize about small business banking nowadays is that it is nothing like how banking is taught in high school civics. In that model, the small business person goes to her local banker and presents a business plan, which the banker may fund if they think it is a good risk.
In the real world, trying to get such an unsecured loan from a bank as a small business will at best result in laughter. My company is no longer what many would call "small" -- we will do millions in revenue this year. But there is no way in the world that my banker of over 10 years will lend to my business unsecured -- they will demand some asset they can put a lien on. So we can get financing of equipment purchases (as a capital lease on the equipment) and on factored receivables and inventory. But without any of that stuff, a new business that just needs cash for startup cash flow is out of luck -- unless the owner has a personal asset, typically a house, on which the banker can place a lien.
So, without home equity, one of the two top sources of capital for small business formation disappears (the other top source is loans from friends and family, which one might also expect to dry up in a tough economy).
Postscript: Banks will make cash flow loans if guaranteed by the SBA. This is another whole can of worms, which I will not discuss today. SBA loans are expensive and difficult to get, and the SBA has a tendency to turn the money spigot on and off at random times. I have often wondered if the SBA helped to kill cash flow lending by banks. First, why make risky small unsecured loans when you can get a government guarantee? And second, with more formulaic lending criteria, SBA lending eliminated the need for loan officers who were good at evaluating business risks. I can say from personal experience that the folks who can intelligently discuss a business plan and its risks are all gone from banks now (at least in the small business market).
Harvard’s Institute of Politics released a poll yesterday that showed millennials’ trust in government at a historic low. This chart shows how many respondents said that they trust the entity in question to do the right thing either all of the time or most of the time. Notably, 20% of millennials said they trust the federal government to do the right thing; 32% said they trust the president; and 14% trust Congress. State and local governments (and, appallingly, the United Nations) fared a little better, but distrust of government is clearly the order of the day....
Which raises, not for the first time, a question I can’t answer: why do people who don’t trust government keep voting for more of it? For a long time, young people have voted mostly Democrat. Which means they are voting to give more of their money, and more control over their lives, to government–especially the federal government. Why would they do that, if only 20% of them trust the federal government to do the right thing?
I won't give a simplistic answer to a complex social issue, but I have a theory that explains at least part of this: gay marriage and other social issues. I get a chance to work with young people a lot, and generally they don't seem to be focused on tax and regulatory issues. They haven't been deep enough into the productive economy (and many will be convinced by their universities never to enter the productive economy) to understand the effects of government interventionism in the economy.
But one thing young people do know is that they are absolutely turned off by the social conservatism of Republicans. I read an article the other day by a Conservative lamenting that young people use certain political positions as social status symbols, as self-identifiers that they are among the elite. But certain ideas also have the opposite affect, acting as a big scarlet A that no one would willingly wear. Among those are opposition to gay marriage, for example. Many young folks, regardless of their position on anything else, would be as unlikely to vote for someone who opposed gay marriage as would be a Victorian society woman to openly admit she was a prostitute. There are certain social positions that many Republicans hold that are complete non-starters to young people, such that they could not consider voting for such a politician even if they agreed with 99% of all the politician's other positions. This tendency is reinforced by college professors, overwhelmingly of the Left, who tell kids that Republicans are not just people with whom they disagree, but bad people who have no place in civil society.
A year or so ago I got tapped to lead an all-too-brief center-right effort in Arizona to legalize gay marriage. I cannot tell you how many Republican leaders and politicians came to me in private and thanked us for what we were doing, saying that the Republican party has to be saved from itself. In the end, we eventually shut the effort down because prominent groups on the Left didn't want a center-right group to get any of the credit. Some of them wanted the effort to go forward, but only if non-Leftists would bow out of the leadership group, and some said explicitly that they did not want the issue solved yet, because the Democrats wanted to flip Arizona blue in 2014 and 2016 and they needed the gay marriage issue to run on, knowing it was a way to pull otherwise libertarian leaning young people away from the Republicans.
Update: I would add that opposition to gay marriage among Republicans also poisons young people to other Republican positions, such as smaller government and free markets (though this libertarian would argue that such Republican positions are often in name only, and not consistently followed, but that is another rant). The biggest lie every person in this country is taught is that somehow Republicans and Democrats offer opposing and internally consistent positions on a political spectrum that only has two dimensions. So if we don't know much about politics but KNOW Republicans have one really bad position, then the whole package must be bad and we should vote Democrat. Which causes us to start self-justifying support for things like economic interventionism that we may not know much about but now is part of our team's position.
Long time readers will know that if I were asked to relive my life doing something entirely different, I would like to try studying economic history. Today, in a bit of a coincidence, my son called me with a question about the effect of the Black Death in Europe on labor and grain prices ... just days after I had been learning about the exact same part of history in Professor Daileader's awesome Teaching Company course on the Middle Ages (actually he has three courses - early, high, late - which are all excellent).
From the beginning of the 14th century, Europe suffered a series of demographic disasters. Climate change in the form of the end of the Medieval warm period led to failed crops and several years of famine early in the century. Then, later in the century, the Black Death came... over and over, perhaps made worse by the fact that Europeans were weakened already from famine. As a result, the population of Europe dropped by something like half.
It is not entirely obvious to me what such a demographic disaster would do to prices. Panic and uncertainty usually drive them up in the near term, but what about after that? Both the supply and demand curves for most everything will be dropping in tandem. So what happens to prices?
In the case of the 14th century, we know the answer: the price of labor rose dramatically, while the price of grain dropped. The combination tended to bankrupt the landholding aristocracy, who went so far as to try to reimpose serfdom to get their finances back in balance (some things never change). The nobility pretty much failed at this in the West (England, France) and were met with a series of peasant revolts. They generally succeeded in the East (Germany, Poland, Russia) which is why a quasi-feudal agricultural system persisted so long in those countries.
But why? Why did grain price go down rather than up? Why did labor go in the opposite direction? I could look it up, but that is no fun.
A first answer, which does not satisfy
People who think of all of the middle ages as "the dark ages" miss the boom that occurred between 1000-1300. Population increased, and technology advanced (just because this technology seems pedestrian to us, like the plow harness for horses or the stirrup, does not make it any less so). It was the only time between about 300 and 1500 when the population was growing (a fact we climate skeptics will note coincided with the Medieval warm period).
But even without the setbacks of the 1300's, historians probably would argue that Europe was headed for a Malthusian collapse no matter what in the 14th century. An enormous amount of forest had been cleared and new farmland created, such that by 1300 some pretty marginal land was being farmed just so Europe could barely keep up with demand. At the margin, really low productivity land was being farmed.
So if there is a sudden 50% population cut, then that means that all that marginal farm land will be abandoned first. While the number of farmers would be cut in half, production would be reduced by less than half because presumably the least productive farms would be abandoned first. With demand cut by half and production cut by less than half, prices would fall for grain.
But this doesn't work for labor. The same argument should apply. To get everyone fed, we would actually need less than half the prior labor force because they would concentrate on the best land. Labor prices should fall in this model as well, but in fact they went up. A lot. In fact, they went up not by a few percent but by multiples, enough to cause enormous social problems across Europe.
A second answer, that makes more sense
After thinking about this for a while, I came to realize that I had the wrong model for the economy in my head. I was thinking about our modern economy. If suddenly, say, online retailing reduces demand for physical stores dramatically, people close stores and redeploy capital and labor and assets to other investments in other industries. That is how I was thinking about the Middle Ages.
But it may be more correct to see the Middle Ages as a one product economy. There was agriculture, period. Everything else was a rounding error.
So now let's think about the "farmers" in the Middle Ages. They are primarily all the 1%, the titled nobility, who either farm big estates with peasant labor or lease large parts of their estates to peasants for farming.
OK, half the population is suddenly gone. The Noble's family has lots of death but someone is still around to inherit. They have a big estate where growing grain supports their lifestyle as well as any military obligations they may have to their lord (though this style of fighting with knights on horseback supported by grants of land is having its last hurrah in the 100 years war).
Then grain prices collapse. That is a clear pricing signal. In the modern economy, that would tell us to get out and find a new place for our capital. So, as Lord Coyote of the Castle Aaaaargh, I am going to do what, exactly? How can I redeploy my capital, when it is essentially illiquid? I can't sell the family land. And if I did, land prices, along with grain prices and the demographic collapse, are falling through the floor. And even if I could sell for cash, what would I do for a living? What would I reinvest the money in? Running an estate is all I know. It's all anyone knows. I have to support myself and my 3 mistresses and my squires and my string of warhorses.
All I can do is try to farm the land I have always farmed. And everyone else does the same. The result is far more grain than anyone needs with the reduced population, so prices fall. But I still need the same number of people to grow the food, irregardless of the price it fetches, but there are now half as many workers available so the price of labor goes through the roof. When grain demand collapsed, there was no way to clear the excess capacity. It turns out everyone had a nearly vertical supply curve, because irregardless of price, they had nothing else they could do with their time and money. You can see now why they tried to solve their problem by reimposing serfdom (combined with price controls, a bad idea for Diocletian and for Nixon and everyone in between).
Of course, nothing is stuck forever. One way capacity cleared was through the growth of the bureaucratic state over the next 2 centuries. Nobles eventually had to find some new way to support themselves, and did so by taking jobs in growing state bureaucracies. They became salaried ministers rather than feudal knights supported by agriculture. At the same time, rising wealth among the 99% non-nobility allowed kings to support themselves through taxes rather than the granting of fiefs, which in turn paid for the nobility to take jobs in the bureaucracy and paid for peasant armies with guns and bows that replaced the lords fighting on horseback. So in the long term, the price signal was inordinately powerful -- so powerful it helped reshape much of European government and society.
By the way, if you are reading this expecting some point about modern politics, sorry. Just something I was thinking about and it helped to write it down. Comments are appreciated. I still have not cribbed the answer from the history texts yet.
Kevin Drum quotes Hugo Dixon on the Greek recovery:
Greece is undergoing an astonishing financial rebound. Two years ago, the country looked like it was set for a messy default and exit from the euro. Now it is on the verge of returning to the bond market with the issue of 2 billion euros of five-year paper.
There are still political risks, and the real economy is only now starting to turn. But the financial recovery is impressive. The 10-year bond yield, which hit 30 percent after the debt restructuring of two years ago, is now 6.2 percent....The changed mood in the markets is mainly down to external factors: the European Central Bank’s promise to “do whatever it takes” to save the euro two years ago; and the more recent end of investors’ love affair with emerging markets, meaning the liquidity sloshing around the global economy has been hunting for bargains in other places such as Greece.
That said, the centre-right government of Antonis Samaras has surprised observers at home and abroad by its ability to continue with the fiscal and structural reforms started by his predecessors. The most important successes have been reform of the labour market, which has restored Greece’s competiveness, and the achievement last year of a “primary” budgetary surplus before interest payments.
Color me suspicious. Both the media and investors fall for this kind of thing all the time -- the dead cat bounce masquerading as a structural improvement. I hope like hell Greece has gotten its act together, but I would not bet my own money on it.
Anyway, that is a bit beside the point. I found Drum's conclusion from all this odd:
If this keeps up—and that's still a big if—it also might be a lesson in the virtue of kicking the can down the road. Back in 2012, lots of commenters, including me, believed that the eurozone had deep structural problems that couldn't be solved by running fire drills every six months or so and then hoping against hope that things would get better. But maybe they will! This probably still wasn't the best way of forging a recovery of the eurozone, but so far, it seems to have worked at least a little better than the pessimists imagined. Maybe sometimes kicking the can is a good idea after all.
For those that are not frequent readers of his, I need to tell you that one of the themes he has been pounding on of late is that the US should not be worried about either its debt levels or inflation -- attempting to rebut the most obvious critiques of his strong support for more deficit spending and monetary stimulus.
I would have thought the obvious moral of this story was that austerity and dismantling all sorts of progressive labor market claptrap led to a recovery far faster than expected**. But since Drum opposes all those steps, his conclusion seems to be simply a return to his frequent theme that debt is A-OK and we shouldn't be worried about addressing it any time soon.
** I don't believe for a moment that Greece has really changed the worst of its structural labor market, regulatory, and taxation issues. This story gets written all the time about countries like, say, Argentina. Sustained incompetence is not really newsworthy, which is likely one reason we get so few African stories. They would all be like "Nigeria still a mess." A false recovery story gives the media two story cycles, one for the false recovery and one for the inevitable sinking back into the pit.
RAND has a study out on changes in people's sources for health insurance. Once you get the hang of reading it, this is a great table:
This is how to read it -- of the 40.7 million uninsured in September of 2013, 26.2 million remained uninsured, 7.2 million got new employer health insurance (ESI) , 3.6 million joined medicaid, etc. But then some new uninsured were added back so the new total uninsured is 31.4 million.
One of the first things to notice is the marketplace number of 3.9 million is well below the Administration's claim of 7.1 million. The Administration's number is not even within the error bar here, so one needs to be skeptical, if he was not already, of Administration sign-up figures.
We also can notice that the individual marketplace seemed to have shrunk from 9.4 million to 7.8 million. No huge surprise, with all the cancellations that made the news last year.
The really interesting question, of course, is what happened to the uninsured. We can use this table to look at net changes (millions of people).
To make sure everyone understands the math, 7.2 million left the ranks of the uninsured to get an employer policy, but 2.1 million previously insured by employers became uninsured. The net is -5.1 million as shown. All the other numbers are calculated the same way.
I have always had serious questions about the value of the Medicaid signups during this period. Medicaid is not a limited enrollment product. You can sign up bleeding on a gurney being rolled into the operating room, and in fact many do -- Hospitals are very good at enrolling people into Medicare as they walk in. So it was really a misnomer in the first place that someone eligible for Medicaid is "uninsured" -- they are in fact insured, they just have not done the paperwork. The Medicaid expansion in the PPACA probably helped, but many states that did not expand Medicaid had a lot of signups as well.
The exchange seems to have done little to affect the uninsured. Net of the reductions in individual insurance presumably driven also by the PPACA, the exchanges reduced the uninsured by 1.2 million.
The really interesting number everyone is looking at is the huge number of the insured that gained employer coverage. Three quarters of the non-Medicare related reduction in uninsured (since I don't consider a lot of the Medicare signups a real reduction) were from people going onto employer plans.
If it’s correct, it was probably motivated multiple factors—I hate the word “synergy” on principle, but it comes to mind. The economy has been improving, so some of the previously unemployed have secured jobs with benefits. But CBO built in expectations about economic recovery, so I don’t think it’s quite right to try pinning all (or even most?) of the 8.2 million on that. The individual mandate, while weak in its first year, might be a stronger stick than we expected, nudging people to take their health benefits where they’d previously been opting out. Employers could be helping this move this trend along; the University of Michigan, for example, eliminated “opt out dollars” in 2014 (cash compensation for employees who declined coverage).
Drum add triumphantly
If this finding is confirmed, it's a genuine shocker. Although CBO projected that ESI would stay steady, there's been a lot of chatter about the likelihood of employers dropping coverage thanks to Obamacare. But that sure doesn't seem to have happened. So in addition to the usual sources of coverage—Medicaid, exchanges, sub-26ers—it looks like Obamacare has yet another big success story to tell, one that was almost completely unexpected.
Uh, maybe. The employer insurance changes could also be an artifact of normal churn and of the odd study period. The study period is only about half a year. If there were annual patterns, ie with people losing employer health care early in the year and then gaining it at the end of the year, then only the gains would show up in the study and not the losses. In fact, there is some reason to believe this is the case, as most corporations have open enrollment periods at the end of the calendar year.
But there is a more interesting issue here. Folks arguing for Obamacare in the first place sold it by implying that most all the uninsured were uninsured because they could not afford coverage or did not have access. Now it turns out a large block of the uninsured actually did have access and could afford it, they just chose not to buy it, for whatever reason. Was this really what it was all about from the very beginning, forcing people to buy a product that they could afford but did not want?
Sorry, this is one of those posts where I am still struggling to figure an issue out, so bear with me if we wander around a bit and the ideas are a bit unfinished.
Kevin Drum and other progressives have been bending over backwards to argue that the now three year delay in implementing PPACA standards for private insurance policies is no big deal.
Really? The PPACA is likely, for Progressives, to be the most important piece of legislation passed during this Administration. Hell, based on the discussion when it was passed, for many it is likely the most important piece of legislation passed in the last three or four decades. And when Republicans suggested delaying these same rules and mandates, e.g. during the government shutdown, they freaked, arguing that people should not have to go another day with their old crappy health care policies.
But now they just roll over and say, yeah, ho hum, this thing that everyone supposedly wanted is a political liability so its fine to delay it, no big deal.
If this were a signature piece of libertarian legislation (yeah, I know its hard to imagine such a thing) that was not being implemented by somebody I voted for and supported, I would be pissed. I would be raking the President over the coals.
This difference in outlook may be why the Republican leadership hates the Tea Party. The Tea Party gets pissed when folks they elect punt on the ideological goals they got elected to pursue. They have no tribal loyalty, only loyalty to a set of policy goals. The key marker in fact of many groups now disparagingly called "extremists" is that they do not blindly support "their guy" in office when "their guy" sells out on the things they want.
I have friends I like and respect -- smart and worldly people -- who are involved in a series of activities to promote political moderation. What I have written in this post is the core of my fear about moderation -- that in real life calls for moderation are actually calls for loyalty to maintaining our current two major parties (and keeping current incumbents in office) over ideas and principles.
Which leads me to an honest question that many of you may take as insulting -- can one be a principled moderate? I am honestly undecided on this. But note that by moderate I do not mean "someone who is neither Republican or Democrat," because I fit that description and most would call me pretty extreme. So "fiscally conservative and socially liberal" is not in my mind inherently "moderate". That is a non-moderate ideological position that is sometimes called "moderate" because it is a mix of Republican and Democrat positions. But I would argue that anyone striving to intellectual consistency cannot be a Republican or Democrat because neither have an internally consistent ideology, and in fact their ideology tends to flip back and forth on certain issues (look at how Republican and Democrat ideology on Presidential power, for example, or drone strikes changes depending on whose guy is in the Oval Office).
Moderates in my mind are folks willing to, or even believe it is superior to, take average positions, eg. "the PPACA just went too far and we should have had a less-far-reaching compromise" or "free trade agreements go too far we need a mix of free trade and protectionism". They value compromise and legislative action (ie passing lots of laws in a fluid and timely manner) over holding firm on particular ideological goals. I guess the most fair way to put it by this definition is they value consensus and projecting a sense of agreement and teamwork over any individual policy goal.
Postscript: One other potential definition of "moderate": One could argue that in actual use by politicians and pundits, "moderate" effectively means "one who agrees with me" and "extremist" means "people who disagree with me." The real solution here may be to accept that "moderate" is an inherently broken word and stop using it.
Update: There are areas where I suppose I am a moderate. For example, I think that making definitive statements about what "science" has been "settled" in the realm of complex systems is insane. This is particularly true in economics. Many findings in economics, if one were honest, are equivocal or boil down to "it depends." The Left is insanely disingenuous to claim that the science is settled that minimum wage increases don't affect employment. But it is equally wrong to say that minimum wage increases always have a large effect on unemployment. For one thing, almost no one (percentage wise) actually makes the minimum wage so we are talking about changes in the first place that affect only a couple of percent of the workforce, and may be mitigated (or exacerbated) by other simultaneous trends in the economy. So of course their impact may not be large (in the same way that regulations on left-handed Eskimo Fortran programmers might not have much of an impact on the larger economy).
We have gotten into this bizarre situation that the science is suddenly always settled about everything, where it would be safer to argue that given the complexity of the systems involved the science can't be settled. I liked this bit I read the other day in the Federalist
One of the more amusing threads that runs through the conversation among the online left is the viewpoint that the science is settled in every arena, and settled in their favor. The data backs the leftward view, and if it doesn’t, there must be a flaw in the data, or in the scientist, or secret Koch-backed dollars behind the research. This bit of hubris leads to saying obviously untrue things – like “every economist from the left and right” says the stimulus has created or saved at least two million jobs. Or that there’s “no solid evidence” that boosting the minimum wage harms jobs. Of course the media knows that these aren’t true, but they largely give these politicians a pass, because dealing in data and with academic research is their turf.
Folks on the Left who want to blame the Tea Party for the destruction of civil discourse need to look at themselves as well, declaring the science settled on everything and then painting their opponents as anti-science for disagreeing. As I have pointed out before, this sort of epistemology is not science but religion, the appeal to authority backed by charges of heresy for those who disagree.
If I were going to make a political plea, it would not be for moderation but for better more respectful practices in the public discourse.
Apparently it is some kind of amazing new insight or quasi-scandal that the Fed seems to care more about inflation than unemployment, at least as measured by the language of its meeting notes.
Call me crazy, but the Fed's job is to manage the currency and money supply, not to manage employment or the broader economy. I have always assumed that it was understood by all that keeping the value of money stable (ie fighting inflation) was the Fed's priority ahead of other economic issues. What am I missing here?
My new column is up at Forbes.com, and asks why we fetishize capital gains over regular income
Let's consider two investors. Investor A buys a piece of land and builds a campground on it, intending to run the campground for decades. Investor A gets her return on investment from the profits each year running the campground, profits that are taxed as regular income (Full disclosure: In my business life, I am essentially investor A).
On the other hand, Investor B buys the same piece of land and builds the same campground on it, but in about a year Investor B sells the newly developed facility, making a profit on the sale over his original investment. Investor B likely will pay taxes on this gain at reduced capital gains tax rates.
But why? When Investor B sold the property, the price he got was probably something like the present value of the expected cash flows from operating the campground. Both Investor A and B created essentially the same value., but Investor B took the value as a single lump sum rather than as a stream of income over time. Why is Investor B's approach preferred in the tax code? Or, stated another way, why does the tax code favor asset flipping over long-term operations?
Want to Make Your Reputation in Academia? Here is an Important Class of Problem For Which We Have No Solution Approach
Here is the problem: There exists a highly dynamic, multi- multi- variable system. One input is changed. How much, and in what ways, did that change affect the system?
Here are two examples:
- The government makes a trillion dollars in deficit spending to try to boost the economy. Did it do so? By how much? (This Reason article got me thinking about it)
- Man's actions increase the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. We are fairly confident that this has some warming effect, but how how much? There are big policy differences between the response to a lot and a little.
The difficulty, of course, is that there is no way to do a controlled study, and while one's studied variable is changing, so are thousands, even millions of others. These two examples have a number of things in common:
- We know feedbacks play a large role in the answer, but the system is so hard to pin down that we are not even sure of the sign, much less the magnitude, of the feedback. Do positive feedbacks such as ice melting and cloud formation multiply CO2 warming many times, or is warming offset by negative feedback from things like cloud formation? Similarly in the economy, does deficit spending get multiplied many times as the money gets respent over and over, or is it offset by declines in other categories of spending like business investment?
- In both examples, we have recent cases where the system has not behaved as expected (at least by some). The economy remained at best flat after the recent stimulus. We have not seen global temperatures increase for 15-20 years despite a lot of CO2 prodcution. Are these evidence that the hypothesized relationship between cause and effect does not exist (or is small), or simply evidence that other effects independently drove the system in the opposite direction such that, for example, the economy would have been even worse without the stimulus or the world would have cooled without CO2 additions.
- In both examples, we use computer models not only to predict the future, but to explain the past. When the government said that the stimulus had worked, they did so based on a computer model whose core assumptions were that stimulus works. In both fields, we get this sort of circular proof, with the output of computer models that assume a causal relationship being used to prove the causal relationship
So, for those of you who may think that we are at the end of math (or science), here is a class of problem that is clearly, just from these two examples, enormously important. And we cannot solve it -- we can't even come close, despite the hubris of Paul Krugman or Michael Mann who may argue differently. We are explaining fire with Phlogiston.
I have no idea where the solution lies. Perhaps all we can hope for is a Goedel to tell us the problem is impossible to solve so stop trying. Perhaps the seeds of a solution exist but they are buried in another discipline (God knows the climate science field often lacks even the most basic connection to math and statistics knowledge).
Maybe I am missing something, but who is even working on this? By "working on it" I do not mean trying to build incrementally "better" economics or climate models. Plenty of folks doing that. But who is working on new approaches to tease out relationships in complex multi-variable systems?
People like to compare what Krugman writes today in his political hack era with what he wrote in his real economist era. But this time I do not have to look that far back.
On February 5 and On February 6, Krugman essentially agrees with the OMB review of Obamacare effects on employment, saying that the health care subsidies for lower-income workers would cause millions to work less by reducing the incentive to work, which he called "a good thing." More here.
On February 9, Krugman returns to a theme he has been hitting on for some weeks now, calling the Republicans anti-science, mean-spririted, etc. for actually believing that unemployment benefits might reduce employment by reducing the incentive to work. And here is what he wrote on the topic on December 8:
The view of most labor economists now is that unemployment benefits have only a modest negative effect on job search — and in today’s economy have no negative effect at all on overall employment. On the contrary, unemployment benefits help create jobs, and cutting those benefits would depress the economy as a whole.
Yes I understand the shape of the subsidy patterns with income are different, but good God man you cannot reasonably argue that the labor supply curve is sensitive to means-tested government subsidies for one program but not at all for another without a heroic analysis that I cannot imagine and Krugman has not supplied.
The Washington Post reports on an updated CBO report:
The Affordable Care Act will reduce the number of full-time workers by more than two million in coming years, congressional budget analysts said Tuesday in the most detailed analysis of the law’s impact on jobs.
After obtaining coverage through the health law, some workers may forgo employment, while others may reduce hours, according to a report by the Congressional Budget Office. Low-wage workers are the most likely to drop out of the workforce as a result of the law, it said. The CBO said the law’s impact on jobs mostly would be felt after 2016.
This almost certainly underestimates the impact. Why? Well, one reason is that a lot of full-time jobs were switched to part-time jobs way back in late 2012. That is what our company did. Why so early? Because according to rules in place at the time (rules that have since been delayed at least a year) the accounting period for who would be considered full-time for the purpose of ACA penalties would be determined by an accounting period that started January 1, 2013. So, if a business wanted an employee to be considered part-time on January 1, 2014 (the original date employer sanctions were to begin), the changes to that employees hours had to be put in place in late 2012. More on this here in Forbes.
In addition, this CBO report is a static analysis of existing business. It does not seem to include any provisions for businesses that have dialed back on investment and expansion in response to the ACA (we have certainly cut back our planned investments, and we can't be the only ones.) This effect is suggested (but certainly not proven) by this chart.
The sequester and government shutdown were cited by the Left as reasons for a sluggish economy. Which government action seems most correlated with a flattening in job growth?
Well, we have completed our response to minimum wage increases in California. As a review, California is raising its minimum wage from $8 to $10 (or 25%) in two steps starting this July 1. I will confess that in some of these cases the causes are complex, and are not just due to minimum wage changes but also other creeping California regulatory issues (particularly the first two).
- Suspended operation and closed on large campground in Ventura County that employed about 25 people
- Suspended investment / expansion plans at two other campgrounds
- Raised prices everywhere else, on average adding $3 to a $20 camping fee. (this is inevitable when wages are increased 25% in a business where more than half the costs are tied to wages and margins are around 5%)
The only reason I take the time to write this is that I think this tends to demonstrate that 1) minimum wage increases can have a real economic impact and 2) just looking at job losses after the date the wage takes effect can miss most of this economic impact.
To this latter point, a lot of the impact is not necessarily job losses. We see lost investment, which perhaps means fewer jobs in the future but there is no way to measure that. We see price increases, which affects consumers and disposable income. And we see some job losses, but note that the job losses were 6 months before the law goes into effect.
We are left with a certainty that the minimum wage had a real economic effect but a suspicion that, at least in this case, that effect would not be measured.
By the way, there may also be a lesson here for those who believe that the entire problem in the economy is one of not enough aggregate demand. In the last month I walked away from a million dollars a year of demand, because it was impossible to serve profitably, in large part due to regulatory issues.
Apparently when prices for things are arbitrarily doubled, the demand for them goes down. Via the New York Times:
On Monday, about 175 employees of the buffet restaurant in the slot-machine and electronic gambling casino in Ozone Park learned that the restaurant had been closed and that their jobs no longer existed. The casino had received plaudits when, in late October, a labor arbitrator issued a ruling that doubled the average pay of workers.
“Everything is done,” said Mariano Cano, 45, a server at the buffet for the past two years. “They just threw us out like dogs. They just gave us a couple of dollars to shut up, and that’s it.”
In October, Mr. Cano’s pay went from just over $5 an hour, plus tips for the drinks he delivered to the tables and dishes he cleared, to around $12, because of the living wage agreement.
This is one of those regulatory overreach paired with corporate cronyism stories, so I won't express any sympathy for the business involved -- it is earning huge rents from insider political deals it cut, and though the NYT does not explain it very well, my sense is that the arbitration requirement on wages was part of that political deal.
But it is amazing to me how much the Left has simply hypnotized itself into believing that minimum wage increases don't affect employment. If we go back a number of months and look at the article where the NYT announced the arbitration decision, there is not one single mention that there might be some job security issues with forcing a doubling of wages.
Jeannine Nixon looked as if she had hit the jackpot. Ms. Nixon, a customer relations representative at Resorts World Casino in Queens, had just learned that she would be making $40,000 a year, up from $22,300.
“It’s life-changing,” Ms. Nixon, her voice cracking, said on Thursday. “I can finally feel relieved.”
It is amazing to me that it did not even occur to any at the NYT to think that a doubling of worker pay might be anything but a pure bonanza. I suppose they were blinded by a sense that casino margins were so high (though I find that the public consistently overestimates margins of many businesses, confusing revenues with profits). Even if the casino is wildly profitable, one had to consider that all activities in the casino were not equally profitable. Restaurants often have thin margins and 20-30% labor costs. There is simply no room for doubling them in a business that typically has single digit margins at best (in fact, most restaurants lose money).
There are a number of reasons why people can fool themselves into thinking that minimum wage increases have no effect on employment
- The biggest reason is that only about 3% of American workers earn the minimum wage. So even a large drop in minimum wage job prospects, say by 10%, might only affect total US employment by a few tenths of a percent, a number that might not be seen in the general economic noise.
- Minimum wage increases are typically implemented in small steps and announced well in advance. Looking at employment the day after vs. the day before the actual date of change likely misses most of the effect. For example, California announced almost a year in advance that minimum wages were going up by 25% in July of 2014. Our company closed one operation and made substantial reductions in our work force in response, but we made these changes in December 2013, months before the change actually took effect.
Which makes this article in the Arizona Republic by Ronald Hansen one of the worst, most facile bits of economic analysis I have ever seen.
But, at the most basic level, there is good reason to think the minimum wage doesn’t kill jobs.
The minimum wage has gone up 22 times since it was instituted in 1938. There is complete seasonally adjusted data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics available for 21 of those hikes.
In 15 of those 21 cases, the U.S. economy added jobs in the year after the minimum wage went up.
On 11 occasions, it added more jobs after the hike than it did in the year before the raise went into effect.
This alone suggests that raising the minimum wage isn’t an automatic drag on employment growth.
This is simply absurd for all the reasons I listed above. I understand how I might find this kind of "analysis" in the comments section of the Daily Kos, but how does one get this past an editor?
I have seen this fact a number of times and am always amazed when I read it, since poverty figures are never, ever presented with this bit of context
LBJ promised that the war on poverty would be an "investment" that would "return its cost manifold to the entire economy." But the country has invested $20.7 trillion in 2011 dollars over the past 50 years. What does America have to show for its investment? Apparently, almost nothing: The official poverty rate persists with little improvement.
That is in part because the government's poverty figures are misleading. Census defines a family as poor based on income level but doesn't count welfare benefits as a form of income. Thus, government means-tested spending can grow infinitely while the poverty rate remains stagnant.
Rector argues that poor today is very different than poor in Johnson's day, and that perhaps we might celebrate a bit
Not even government, though, can spend $9,000 per recipient a year and have no impact on living standards. And it shows: Current poverty has little resemblance to poverty 50 years ago. According to a variety of government sources, including census data and surveys by federal agencies, the typical American living below the poverty level in 2013 lives in a house or apartment that is in good repair, equipped with air conditioning and cable TV. His home is larger than the home of the average nonpoor French, German or English man. He has a car, multiple color TVs and a DVD player. More than half the poor have computers and a third have wide, flat-screen TVs. The overwhelming majority of poor Americans are not undernourished and did not suffer from hunger for even one day of the previous year.
Remember what I presented a while back. This is what the Left thinks, or wants us to think, American income inequality looks like -- our rich are richer than comparable European welfare states because our poor are poorer.
And this is what income inequality in the US actually looks like -- our rich and middle class are richer, but our poor are not poorer. A less redistributionist approach floats all boats. I compared the US to many European welfare states, using the Left's own data source. Here is an example, but hit the link to see it all.
I thought this was a useful simple picture from Arnold Kling, vis a vis countries and their economies:
|Low Creation||High Creation|
|Low Destruction||Corporatist Stagnation||Schumpeterian Boom|
|High Destruction||Minsky Recession||Rising Dynamism|
He suggests the US may currently be in the lower-left quadrant. Europe and Japan in the upper left. My sense is that China is in the upper right, not the lower right (too much of the economy is controlled by the politicians in power for any real destruction to occur).
Once a government gains powerful tools for economic intervention, it becomes politically almost impossible to allow destruction to occur, no matter how long-term beneficial it can be. The US is one of the few countries in the world that has ever allowed such destruction to occur over an extended period. The reason it is hard is that successful incumbents are able to wield political power to prevent upstart competition that might threaten their position and business model (see here for example).
It takes a lot of discipline to have government not intervene in favor of such incumbents. Since politicians lack this discipline, the only way to prevent such intervention is by castrating the government, by eliminating its power to intervene in the first place. Feckless politicians cannot wield power that does not exist (though don't tell Obama that because he seems to be wielding a lot of power to modify legislation that is not written into my copy of the Constitution.).
The media tends to talk about the growth of the Chinese economy as if it is something new and different. In fact, there probably have been only about 200 years in the history of civilization when China was not the largest economy on Earth. China still held this title into the early 18th century, and will get it back early in this century.
This map from the Economist (via Mark Perry) illustrates the point.
Of course there is a problem with this map. It is easy to do a center of gravity for a country, but for the whole Earth? The center in this case (unless one rightly puts it somewhere in the depths of the planet itself) depends on arbitrary decisions about where one puts the edges of the map. I presume this is from a map with North America on the far left side and Japan on the far right. If one redid the map, say, with North America in the center, Asia on the left and Europe on the right, the center of gravity would roam around North America through history.