Coyote Blog

Apparently, Chrysler is toast.  Which is what a lot of us were saying before taxpayers put billions of dollars into it.  (ht:  Maggies Farm)

Rumors, credible rumors, are beginning to circulate in the car industry and the automotive press, that Chrysler may not make it another year primarily due to its falling sales and growing financial losses at partner Fiat….

The Congressional Oversight Panel has already said taxpayers will not see most of the $81 billion that they put into the American car industry. The $14.3 billion put into Chrysler is more and more likely to be lost completely. The biggest single loser if Chrysler cannot survive is the UAW which owns 55% of the company.

I struggle to cry much for the UAW with that last part.  They only own 55% because the President intervened to give what should have belonged to the secured credit holders over to the UAW in exchange for being so helpful in getting him elected.

In January 2009, Chrysler stood on the brink of insolvency.  Purporting to act under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, the Treasury extended Chrysler a $4 billion loan using funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  Still in a bad financial situation, Chrysler initially proposed an out-of-court reorganization plan that would fully repay all of Chrysler’s secured debt.  The Treasury rejected this proposal and instead insisted on a plan that would completely eradicate Chrysler’s secured debt, hinging billions of dollars in additional TARP funding on Chrysler’s acquiescence.

When Chrysler’s first lien lenders refused to waive their secured rights without full payment, the Treasury devised a scheme by which Chrysler, instead of reorganizing under a chapter 11 plan, would sell its assets free of all secured interests to a shell company, the New Chrysler.  Chrysler was thus able to avoid the “absolute priority rule,” which provides that a court should not approve a bankruptcy plan unless it is “fair and equitable” to all classes of creditors.

I had more here.

Update: A firsthand account from a hosed secured creditor (pdf)

Details of the bankruptcy were unprecedented. For the first time in American history and totally counter to all established laws of bankruptcy, secured creditors would receive less than nonsecured creditors….

Indiana’s legal filings in the Chrysler, LLC bankruptcy sale made three essential points: First, the bankruptcy laws which have been in place protecting the rights of secured creditors cannot be arbitrarily overthrown by an act of the Executive. This is a violation of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution in that Congress is solely assigned the role to determine uniform bankruptcy law. Neither the Courts nor the Executive can do this arbitrarily. Our funds suffered a “taking” in violation of the Fifth Amendment in that there was no “due process of law”. There was, and is in all financial arrangements between debtor and creditor, a contractual relationship, which is here being rendered null and void. If allowed to stand, this violation of two party contracts undermines a basic and essential tenet of debt financing in the capital markets.

Second, money provided by the federal government to Chrysler is being provided illegally and clearly counter to the intent of Congress. When TARP was being debated then Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson testified the money was NOT for the auto companies. It was targeted to aid the ailing financial industry, i.e, those with “Troubled Assets” that needed a “Recovery Program.” Evidence that the money was NOT intended to be an automotive bailout bill could not be more clearly illustrated than to review the failure of the separate automobile bailout bill presented in Congress in December 2008. If Congress had intended the TARP bill to cover the auto companies when it passed in October 2008, why were they even attempting to pass a separate automobile bailout bill just two months later? We believe both the Bush and Obama administration have acted illegally in this use of TARP funds.

Third, we argue that a sub rosa or “under-the-table-arrangement” between the Treasury and Chrysler prevented a fair valuation of the assets. In a legitimate auction sale, no potential bidder would be allowed to set the value of the assets being auctioned. But that is precisely what happened in this case as the Treasury was assigning values to creditors, determining which assets would be liquidated, what new parties, (i.e., Fiat SpA), would be brought into the deal, and how a new dealership network would be defined, etc. It was known from the outset that when the Chapter 11, Section 363 sale of the assets would occur, there would be only one bidder: the U.S. Treasury. Secured creditors could not have their rights protected or fairly valued in such an arrangement. Such an “insider-deal” reeks of impropriety.

GM is apparently emerging from bankruptcy.  It will have the same (though fewer) managers, employees, and assembly plants.  It will have the same product designers, marketers, strategists, and planners.  It will have roughly the same organization systems, the same culture, and the same history.   Though it was able to shed some plants and employees, it will have most of the same stifling work rules on the shop floor.  It did, however,  manage to shed a lot of interest payments to creditors who entrusted their money to GM in return for claims on GM assets, only to be given the shaft by the Obama administration,

The main difference in the new GM is that it will have an ownership group whose primary concerns are NOT the financial success of the company.  The UAW will be primarily concerned with keeping union members employed and happy and not shifting any manufacturing to lower-cost venues.  The US Government will be primarily concerned with making sure the UAW is happy and promoting a number of its own goals, like “sustainable” plants and smaller cars, irrespective of whether these goals make business sense.  It will be a company more concerned with whether plants have recycling programs and workers with American passports rather than cost or quality.  Both the UAW and the US government can pursue such non-business goals secure in the knowledge that financial success is virtually irrelevant, as the US taxpayer can be counted on to make up any shortfalls.

I have not blogged much in the last week on the Obama takeover of GM, but you can take all my old Chrysler posts and just substitute “GM” for “Chrysler” and you will have it pretty much straight.   Having gotten away with hammering secured creditors in favor of the UAW at Chrysler, Obama is setting the same course at GM.  Via Q&O:

The United Auto Workers retiree health fund is set to own as much as 39 percent of the restructured GM, in exchange for giving up its claim to at least $10 billion that the company owes it….

The chief obstacle to an out-of-court settlement for GM remains: There has been no agreement between the company and the investors who hold $27 billion worth of GM bonds.

Under orders from the Obama administration, GM has offered to give the bondholders a 10 percent equity stake in the restructured company in exchange for giving up their bonds.

Hmmm…  let’s give unsecured creditor the UAW a 10x better deal than the secured creditors.  No wonder Obama wants to keep this out of bankruptcy court — laws and contracts and stuff actually would have to be applied there.   But the company will be set for the future — the US and Canadian governments will control a majority of the board seats, with the rest presumably controlled by the UAW.  Does everybody believe me now when I say we are heading toward a European-style corporate state?

The only thing standing in the way, of course, is those pesky secured creditors, who are actually holding out for what they are legally and contractually due.   Obama’s got a bit more difficulty here at GM than at Chrysler because a smaller percentage of the secured creditors are TARP recipients, and therefore he has less leverage to make them give up their rights  (at Chrysler, the TARP majority was pressured successfully into selling out their non-TARP brethren among the creditors).

Of course, Obama has the advantage of Chrysler as a precedent, which makes it pretty clear why he set Chrysler up as the first to be intimidated, as he had the most leverage over them with TARP recipients in the creditor group.  Interestingly, this is very similar to how the UAW has always dealt with the Big 3, targeting the most vulnerable for pressure in contract talks, and then using that settlement as a precedent in the rest of industry.  One wonders if the UAW hasn’t been whispering in his ear through this whole process.

I couldn’t believe this when I read it:

General Motors is open to considering moving its headquarters from Detroit, selling off U.S. plants and even renegotiating parts of its restructuring plan with its major union, the new chief executive said Monday….

A move by GM to leave Detroit would represent another blow for the economy of a region already reeling from the bankruptcy of Chrysler and the sharp downturn in auto manufacturing.

GM purchased its glass-towered headquarter building known as Detroit’s Renaissance Center last year for $625 million.

The article moves on to other topics, but I was struck by this:  A year ago, when bankruptcy was only months away (delayed only by injections of taxpayer money), with the real estate market teetering at its peak and just starting to fall off, with GM hemorraging cash, GM decides to … spend $625 million on Detroit commercial real estate.

This is outrageous.  All the more so because GM’s fortunes and the value of downtown Detroit real estate have a beta coefficient that is probably well above 1.  In other words, if GM decides it wants to sell the building, Detroit commercial real estate is going to tank on the news that GM is leaving Detroit, making the real estate virtually worthless.  It is very dangerous to buy an asset for which you are the only possible buyer if there is any possibility you might want to sell it some day.

I understand that companies that have losing business models often find it more profitable to invest outside of their business**, but GM seems to have found the only investment on the planet worse than their own stock.

** Postscript: I am not a huge Roger Smith fan, but this was essentially his strategy — GM sucks as an investment, so I am going to invest outside of the auto industry.  Though he caught a lot of grief for it, most of his investments outside of GM turned out to have a substantially higher return for shareholders than his (or his successors’) investments inside of GM.   Wikipedia writes:

Smith’s purchases of EDS and Hughes were criticized as unwise diversions of resources at a time when GM could have invested more in its core automotive divisions.

But what if investments in your core business are even more unwise?

Via Zero Hedge:

A group of Chrysler creditors opposing the carmaker’s reorganization is likely to disband after two more investment firms withdrew from its membership, a person briefed on the matter told DealBook on Friday.

The withdrawals of OppenheimerFunds and Stairway Capital Management will likely drop the group, calling itself the Committee of Non-TARP Lenders, below 5 percent of Chrysler’s $6.9 billion in secured debt, this person said. That would almost certainly eliminate the group’s standing in federal bankruptcy court.

Ever since the group made public last week, its membership has shrunken by the day as it faced public criticism from President Obama and others. That continued withdrawal of firms led Oppenheimer and Stairway to conclude that they could not succeed in opposing the Chrysler reorganization plan in court, the two firms said in separate statements.

Just another step closer to a Mussolini-style corporate state.

Update: David Skeel argues the Chrysler bankruptcy settlement is a sham sale of the sort that was outlawed in 1938.  Except, of course, when the President does it, I guess.

From a reader, via Bloomberg

GM’s offer is “grossly unfair to the point of abusive,” Glenn Reynolds, chief executive officer of CreditSights Inc. in New York, wrote in a report this week. “Politics remains an overriding factor in the equation and has been decidedly unfriendly to the interest of bondholders in a contest with the disproportionately outsized power of organized labor and other Washington-heavy constituencies and interest groups.”…

“The attack on institutional investors by the administration in this process is a very strange approach and borders on demagoguery,” CreditSights’ Reynolds wrote in the report. “The bondholders are being painted into a corner and will have no chance but to stand and fight. You can call them names as long as they get treated fairly. Offer them virtually nothing and then call them names? Now that’s just cold.”

And here is Cliff Asness, a hedge fund manager not involved with Chrysler:

• “Let’s be clear, it is the job and obligation of all investment managers, including hedge fund managers, to get their clients the most return they can. They are allowed to be charitable with their own money, and many are spectacularly so, but if they give away their clients’ money to share in the “sacrifice”, they are stealing.”
• “The President screaming that the hedge funds are looking for an unjustified taxpayer-funded bailout is the big lie writ large. Find me a hedge fund that has been bailed out. Find me a hedge fund, even a failed one, that has asked for one. In fact, it was only because hedge funds have not taken government funds that they could stand up to this bullying. The TARP recipients had no choice but to go along.”
• “The President’s attempted diktat takes money from bondholders and gives it to a labor union that delivers money and votes for him. Why is he not calling on his party to “sacrifice” some campaign contributions, and votes, for the greater good? Shaking down lenders for the benefit of political donors is recycled corruption and abuse of power.”

Finem Respice has a great post on the Administration’s bare-knuckle tactics in trying to enforce its will (against the dictates of bankruptcy law) on Chrysler:

It should be obvious to most observers that, recent allegations of strong-arm tactics in negotiations with Chrysler creditors notwithstanding, given the current situation the White House shouldn’t need to resort to anything so openly thuggish as naked threats issued by the likes of Steven Rattner. Assuming for a moment, and for the purposes of conversation, that the allegations are substantially true (and I believe they are), the fact that a bit of Chicago-style thuggery seems to have been required- and seems to have failed- says a lot about this White House. It also says quite a bit about the wild overconfidence intrinsic in the administration and how entirely unused to being denied their will are the senior members thereof. A more deft executive need not have pushed so hard, or rattled the saber of class warfare so loudly, but then a more deft executive would not have expected so much….

There are three things that are scarier than the actual resort to common thuggery. The ease with which it comes to this administration. The ubiquitous and rank ineptitude that makes a resort to thuggery necessary in the first place- and promises it will become a common tactic in the days to come. And the forgiveness the population regularly affords the administration after one or another of these episodes is, yet again, made public.

The tantrums that follow missed targets sketch an interesting family portrait of a class of politically spoiled children, think Hillary Clinton meets Paris Hilton- totally devoid of real executive experience but somehow still used to getting their way no matter what some silly law book says. I believe I’ll take my chances with the “speculators” over these alternatives any day, particularly when the spoiled children have the 82nd Airborne Division in their toy chest.

When Obama, who has no real experience with bankruptcy or really with any business enterprise, attempts to substitute for a bankruptcy judge, we have to ask ourselves why.  He certainly does not have as much experience or expertise.  He has no particular unique knowledge of the business.  The only unique “quality” Obama has that a bankruptcy judge does not is that Obama does not feel bound by bankruptcy law.   The only possible reason for his involvement is to substitute his desired outcome for the one that would result from the normal application of contract law and bankruptcy precedents.  Since this is an inherently political process, it should not be surprising that at its core, Obama’s actions are meant to promote the interests of a politically important Democratic constituency at the expense of a group of bondholders he is confident he can portray to the public as unsympathetic.

Megan McArdle said it quite well:

For the record, I have no problem with whatever cramdown those debtholders–or any others–get in bankruptcy court.  If the judge thinks that the reorganization can’t be done without making the UAW basically whole, fine.  I just think that the reorganization should be done under the well-established procedures of the bankruptcy court, not at the behest of an administration trying to reward its supporters.

It’s all very well to say that most of the senior lenders are going along, but of course, the leading senior lenders are doing this because the administration has them over a barrel.  I think most of the people enthusing about this actually recognize that in other countries, when the government uses the banking system as a slush fund to reward its constituencies, this generally turns out badly–and makes the banking system a lot more frail.

Nor will it fly to claim that the administration’s threats–and note that Perella Weinberg has most carefully not denied that they were threatened–are just standard jawboning.  Standard jawboning does not involve the White House bloody press corps.  It is true that DIP financiers often get to demand serious concessions from creditors, but those creditors are limited by what those creditors would get out of a recession, and are aimed at either maximizing enterprise value, or maximizing the likelihood that the loan will be repaid.  This deal does neither.

Perhaps it’s idealistic of me, but the American bankruptcy system actually works very, very well.  I think we should be very cautious about mucking with it, particularly when there’s no reason to.  The administration didn’t need to beat up the creditors in order to reorganize the company–or at least, they wouldn’t have needed to do so, if they weren’t trying to make the creditors take less than they’d get in a liquidation.  Nor did it need to do so to keep the UAW at the table–unlike capital, the UAW isn’t going anywhere.  The administration is beating up the creditors because a) it wants to give the UAW a much better deal than they’d get in liquidation and b) they’d like someone else to pay for it.

Update: More of the same coming out (as I predicted here):

Although the focus has so been on allegations that the White House threatened Perella Weinberg, sources familiar with the matter say that other firms felt they were threatened as well. None of the sources would agree to speak except on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of political repercussions.

The sources, who represent creditors to Chrysler, say they were taken aback by the hardball tactics that the Obama administration employed to cajole them into acquiescing to plans to restructure Chrysler. One person described the administration as the most shocking “end justifies the means” group they have ever encountered. Another characterized Obama was “the most dangerous smooth talker on the planet- and I knew Kissinger.” Both were voters for Obama in the last election.

One participant in negotiations said that the administration’s tactic was to present what one described as a “madman theory of the presidency” in which the President is someone to be feared because he was willing to do anything to get his way. The person said this threat was taken very seriously by his firm.

The White House has denied the allegation that it threatened Perella Weinberg.

So what may be the most important Chapter 11 proceeding in modern history has begun — important not just because it is large, but because the court in a sense is being asked to validate or invalidate the unprecedented power grab by the Obama administration.  The results of this trial may well slow or accelerate America’s devolution into a European-style corporate state where political pull rather than costs or products determine corporate success.  It also will have a lot to say as to whether the rule of law has any meaning any more, at least as far as President’s go.

The first salvo, by the non-TARP secured creditors that Obama was unsuccessful in beating down, has been fired:

Just hitting the Chrysler bankruptcy docket is an objection filed by W&C on behalf of its clients, objecting to the 363 asset sale. The filing is attached below (and linked here). Some very harsh language with regards to Uncle Sam in there…

The summary of the grounds for the objection:

1. The Proposed Sale Constitutes an Illegal Sub Rosa Plan that Redistributes Value Among Creditor Classes.

2. The Proposed Sale Fails the Requirement of Section 363(f).

3. The Sale Is Not Proposed In Good Faith.

4. The Taking of Collateral through a Direct or Indirect Use of TARP Authority is Unconstitutional. (This one is Huge as it sets a case law precedent.)

Over the weekend, there was a lot of back and forth with W&C (White & Case) senior attorney Tom Lauria, who said that one of his clients gave in to the restructuring when threatened by the Obama administration with having its reputation destroyed by the White House press office.   Both the White House press office and the client in question denied this account of events, but never-the-less Obama was indeed vilifying the holdouts, though in a general rather than specific way.

This is probably only the tip of the iceberg.  I think if creditors start to see that the bankruptcy judge is unwilling to automatically roll over for the administration, more such revelations will emerge.  The blog Finem Respice has a doozy, though it is unsourced and so must be treated with caution.

Apparently a number of the lenders to Chrysler were recipients of TARP money, and thus were especially susceptible to Obama Administration blackmail to take less money for their Chrysler debt than they would normally get in bankruptcy court.   In effect, Obama is asking for partial payment for the TARP money in the form of concessions to Chrysler’s other parties in the bankruptcy, mainly their unions.

But the TARP money is MY money.  And I don’t want to get paid back this way.  If these lenders have the ability now to pay out billions of dollars (in the form of forgiven loans) then I would rather see them returning this money to the Treasury rather than sticking it in the pocket of the UAW or propping up a zombie auto company that hasn’t made a car I would even consider buying in over 10 years.

TARP is going to turn out to be the greatest tool ever invented for increasing the power of government in the economy and accelerating the development of the American corporate state.  And Obama can laugh all the way to the bank(s) knowing that it was a Republican administration that handed him this power.

Postscript: I thought this was funny, via Instapundit:

And though I’m not a gearhead, I’m a little surprised to hear the administration saying that Chrysler is going to be saved by–Fiat’s world-class engineering.

All the more so given that Daimler couldn’t help.

Good for Megan McArdle:

when did it become the government’s job to intervene in the bankruptcy process to move junior creditors who belong to favored political constituencies to the front of the line?  Leave aside the moral point that these people lent money under a given set of rules, and now the government wants to intervene in our extremely well-functioning (and generous) bankruptcy regime solely in order to save a favored Democratic interest group.

No, leave that aside for the nonce, and let’s pretend that the most important thing in the world, far more interesting than stupid concepts like the rule of law, is saving unions.  What do you think this is going to do to the supply of credit for industries with powerful unions?  My liberal readers who ardently desire a return to the days of potent private unions should ask themselves what might happen to the labor movement in this country if any shop that unionizes suddenly has to pay through the nose for credit.  Ask yourself, indeed, what this might do to Chrysler, since this is unlikely to be the last time in the life of the firm that they need credit.  Though it may well be the last time they get it, on anything other than usurious terms.

I am not sure I agree with the last part.  While banks seem to have an unbelievably long memory when it comes to you or I trying to get a loan after we forgot to return those Columbia House records 15 years ago and couldn’t pay our bills, major banks have goldfish memories when it comes to major losses.  Whether it be lending to Latin American companies or to industries like airlines that go bankrupt with clockwork regularity, banks seem perfectly capable of repeating the same mistakes over and over again.

This is in part due to something I was trying to tell folks waaaaay back in October with the threatened liquidity crisis — banks have to lend.  There is simply no good business model for a bank that involves sitting on hoards of cash under the mattress.  And when you have tens of billions of dollars to lend, you can’t just do it in $100 increments — you have to lend big slabs to large institutions.  And given that lots of other banks are trying to lend to the same guys, someone is going to issue that $300 million line of credit to Chrysler a couple of years hence.

Given the deal Obama is trying to foist on them, it is no surprise bondholders are ready to take their chances with bankruptcy court.  I makes me sick to see Obama piously calling out these bondholders as if they are somehow corrupt and evil, when in fact their only crime is not to take the hosing Obama is trying to give them:

According the Treasury-GM debt-for-equity swap announced Monday, GM has $27.2 billion in unsecured bonds owned by the public. These are owned by mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds and retail investors who bought them directly through their brokers. Under Monday’s offer, they would exchange their $27.2 billion in bonds for 10% of the stock of the restructured GM. This could amount to less than five cents on the dollar.

The Treasury, which is owed $16.2 billion, would receive 50% of the stock and $8.1 billion in debt — as much as 87 cents on the dollar. The union’s retiree health-care benefit trust would receive half of the $20 billion it is owed in stock, giving it 40% ownership of GM, plus another $10 billion in cash over time. That’s worth about 76 cents on the dollar, according to some estimates.

In a genuine Chapter 11 bankruptcy, these three groups of creditors would all be similarly situated — because all three are, for the most part, unsecured creditors of GM. And yet according to the formula presented Monday, those with the largest claim — the bondholders — get the smallest piece of the restructured company by a huge margin.

This seems to be by political design

From the WSJ via Reason

I am not shocked that Obama is full of sh*t –  all politicians are.  But I am constantly surprised at just how awful the press has become.

Here was the Arizona Republic towing the government line, attempting to stampede the country into subsidizing the auto companies because bankruptcy would be a disaster:

Advocates for the nation’s automakers are warning that the collapse of the Big Three – or even just General Motors – could set off a catastrophic chain reaction in the economy, eliminating up to 3 million jobs and depriving governments of more than $150 billion in tax revenue.

Industry supporters are offering such grim predictions as Congress weighs whether to bail out the nation’s largest automakers, which are struggling to survive the steepest economic slide in decades.

Even if just GM collapsed, the failure could bring down the other two companies – and even the U.S. operations of foreign automakers – as parts suppliers run out of money and shut down….

Automakers say bankruptcy protection is not an option because people would be reluctant to make long-term car and truck purchases from companies that might not last the life of their vehicles.

There was absolutely no background on the chapter 11 process, or any mention by this reporter or in any subsequent AZ Republic article that bankrupcy meant anything but liquidation and disaster. Not even a hint that many large companies, including the largest company based in Phoenix — US Airways — have operated seamlessly through chapter 11.

It was left to bloggers like myself to remind folks that the businesses and assets don’t just go *poof* in a bankruptcy, and in fact it is generally in creditors’ interests to have the company continue to operate.

So, now that Chrysler is heading for bankruptcy, Obama’s incentives are now to make chapter 11 look friendly instead of menacing.  And the AZ Republic is finally, after 6 months of coverage, explaining what this really means:

Bankruptcy doesn’t mean the nation’s No. 3 automaker will shut down. A Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing would allow a judge to decide how much the company’s creditors would get while the company continues to operate. The goal is for the whole process to happen quickly, Obama said, perhaps within a couple months.

I thought this was priceless:

[Obama] said a group of investment firms and hedge funds were holding out for the prospect of an unjustified taxpayer bailout.

“I don’t stand with them,” Obama said at the White House event.

I actually don’t think this is true — as secured creditors, they are FIRST in line in a bankruptcy.  Obama has effectively told them to voluntarily move to the back of the line, and they reasonably said “no way.”  Obama is miffed that they have not taken his royal direction, but I think they are correct they will get more out of a process run by bankruptcy law rather than one run by political pull.

But, even if hedge funds had this expectation of a taxpayer bailout, who in the hell do you think has given them reason to have this expectation?  Can anyone say “moral hazard?”

I am trying to figure out what kind of thinking this post from Kevin Drum represents:

According to people “familiar with the talks,” several of Chrysler’s bondholders have rejected the government’s deal, which amounted to paying them off a little more than 30 cents on the dollar.  So that means it’s probably Chapter 11 time.  Blecch.  I hope the holdouts all end up getting less from the judge than they would have gotten from Obama.

There is only one possible reason** for Obama’s attempt to avert a Chrysler bankruptcy — he is trying to divert value from one group who would get it under a bankruptcy to another group.  There can be no other explanation for what he is trying to do, and in fact evidence is pretty strong that he has been trying to get creditors to take less so unions, who supported his election, can get more.

What has happened is that creditors have refused to get bullied by this near-unprecedented intervention by a US President in a bankruptcy case and are holding out for what they feel is the best way to recover as much as possible of what they are owed (no one is coming out whole).  In this context, Drum’s pique really seems petty.  Rather than press for the money they are legitimately owed, the creditors should have bowed down, I guess, to the King’s wishes and given up their money to those courtiers who were smart enough to back the King’s coronation.

What Drum is probably most upset about is that it is now clear that both Bush and his guy Obama have spent tens of billions of dollars of taxpayer money to absolutely no end, just delaying a bankruptcy that would have been better for economic recovery if it had happened six months ago.

** There is one other explanation — Obama may feel like he is better able to mediate a bankruptcy than a bankruptcy court and judge with decades of experience in the field.  I hope this kind of hubris is not the case, but for this administration it is very possible.  Obama is every bit as unaware of his inability to achieve his goals through shear force of will in domestic policy as GWB was in foreign policy.

Megan McArdle outlines some of the latest terms of a GM creditor settlment.  The interesting facts for me were:

• Creditors get 10% of equity in exchange for $27 billion in concessions  ($2.7B per percentage point)
• Employees get 39% of equity in exchange for $10 billion in concessions ($0.26B per percentage point)

McArdle argues that there are good reasons bankruptcy courts tend to give labor a good deal, and having argued all along to allow bankrupcy courts to sort this mess out following the usual rules, I am not going to reverse myself.

But is it really the case that, push come to shove, bondholders get a deal 10 times worse than employees?  If this is the case, I am surprised people ever buy bonds in a company with a large employee retirement overhang.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Obama has made an enormous blunder, driven in part by his best-and-the-brightest-style hubris, in taking personal ownership of GM.  Not because it will be an enormous waste of taxpayer money, because I don’t think he cares about a few tens of billions of our money.  It is a blunder because GM may not be fixable, and if it is salvageable in some smaller format, it will require painful compromises by politically powerful groups Obama really does not want to square off with.

Obama’s stepping forward and claiming ownership for GM’s success strikes me as roughly equivalent to someone stepping forward in March of 1945 to take ownership of the German war effort.   The decision is all the dumber because there was a perfectly good alternative — ie the bankrupcy courts — with far more experience (not to mention authority and legislative mandate) to handle these type of situations.

Megan McArdle has a good roundup of what challenges face GM and the Obamacrats.

Update: Obama seems to be hinting that a bankruptcy may still be in the cards.  The key challenge for him will be to deal with the obvious accusation of why he didn’t allow this before spending $20 billion or so of taxpayer money.  Expect the administration to be focus-grouping and trial-ballooning various euphamisms for chapter 11 to disguise this problem.

After giving tens of billions of dollars of our money to the auto makers, Obama has now figured out what I and many others knew years ago:

Obama, responding to a question during an online town hall meeting, said the current business model for U.S. carmakers was unsustainable and the Big Three would need to change their ways.

From the article, however, it is still clear that Obama has no intention of allowing GM to go into chapter 11, as they should have 6 months ago.   There is a good political reason for this — remember what I explained before.   Obama is working to equate chapter 11 with the disappearance of the American auto industry, clearly an untrue and facile proposition.  Many large companies, from airlines to energy companies to equipment manufacturers, have gone bankrupt over the last several decades and continued operations or at least had their productive assets taken over by other companies.  GM’s assets are not just going to go poof.

However, there is a clear set of winners and losers in a bankruptcy — and there is enough case law on it that all the players at GM know it and they know into which category they fall.  Those who are lower down the food chain are hoping that putting the restructuring in Obama’s hands rather than those of the bankruptcy process will improve their outcomes.  And, to get those higher on the food chain (ie senior debt holders) to accept this they need the government to bring taxpayer money to the table.  The whole point of an Obama-led restructuring, then, is not to somehow preserve the US auto industry but to improve the financial position of certain GM stakeholders at the expense of US taxpayers  (and probably consumers, and some sort of protectionism is likely to be part of this deal).

But here is the most interesting point that was really hammered into me in reading this article.  If you were to rank Obama as to where he stood vis a vis all American adults in terms of his knowledge of business and what it takes for a company to be successful, where would you rank him?  I don’t think very many would put him in the top half.  In fact, given that he has never, to my knowledge, had any real job in business of any sort (not even a high school job at McDonald’s or something similar), I am not sure I would put him above the 10th percentile.  Anyway, put your own number to this question, and then read these quotes from the linked article

The president said he planned to announce decisions on the future of the industry in the coming days.

“But my job is to measure the costs of allowing these auto companies just to collapse versus us figuring out – can they come up with a viable plan?” he said.

White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Obama will announce his strategy for the auto industry before he leaves for Europe on Tuesday.

Seriously, would you hand over your business or your stock portfolio for Obama to manage?  I didn’t think so.  It takes years of experience to be able to read a business plan skeptically.  And even people who are experienced at it fail a lot.

By the way, for those who suspect that decisions will not be based on actual market realities but satisfaction of pet political goals, you are probably correct:

The president said even as the economy bounces back, Detroit can’t focus on “trying to build more and more SUVs and counting on gas prices being low.”…

Gibbs said Obama still thinks U.S. automakers build cars that Americans want to buy. Both he and the president own Ford Escape hybrids. “It’s a nice car,” Gibbs said. “It really is.”

So, for example, one can assume its likely the Obama strategy for GM success will include lots of hybrids.  Of course, the market reality is this:

the slowdown has been particularly brutal for hybrids, which use electricity and gasoline as power sources. They were the industry’s darling just last summer,  but sales have collapsed as consumers refuse to pay a premium for a fuel-efficient vehicle now that the average price of a gallon of gasoline nationally has slipped below $2.

“When gas prices came down, the priority of buying a hybrid fell off quite quickly,” said Wes Brown, a partner at Los Angeles-based market research firm Iceology.

I personally believe that a meer restructuring of GM is unlikely to create a turnaround, as I discussed here.

Postscript- It is a bit apples and oranges for me to say that Obama is evaluating business plans here.  In fact, he is not.  Though he calls them that, if the Chrysler retructuring plan they put on the web is any guide, these are political plans, not business plans.  No real business plan, for example, seeking to attract private capital would prioritize the goals “Commitment to Energy Security and Environmental Sustainability”, “Compliance with Fuel Economy Regulations,” and “Compliance with Emissions Regulations” ahead of “Achieving a Competitive Product Mix and Cost Structure.”  In fact, the section about costs and competitive products comes dead last in the Chrysler plan, almost as an afterthought.

Update: This sad story about athletes and their difficulty in managing their money seems relevent.  These guys, who have spent their whole life getting really good at one thing, don’t even have the basic financial vocabulary to understand money management, and absolutely no ability to parse a business plan:

It began in the winter of 1991 when he sank $300,000 into the Rock N’ Roll Café, a theme restaurant in New England designed to ride the wave of the Hard Rock Cafe and Planet Hollywood franchises. One of his advisers pitched the idea as “fail-proof, with no downsides,” Ismail recalls. He never recouped his money and has no idea what became of the restaurant.

Lesson learned? If only. After that Ismail squandered a fortune funding not only that inspirational movie but also the music label COZ Records (“The guy was a real good talker,” says Rocket); a cosmetics procedure whereby oxygen was absorbed into the skin (“We were not prepared for the sharks in the beauty industry”); a plan to create nationwide phone-card dispensers (“When I was in college, phone cards were a big deal”); and, recently, three shops dubbed It’s in the Name, where tourists could buy framed calligraphy of names or proverbs of their choice (“The main store opened up in New Orleans, but doggone Hurricane Katrina came two months later”). The shops no longer exist.

You might say Ismail had a run of terrible luck, but the odds were never close to being in his favor. Industry experts estimate that only one in 30 of the highest-caliber private investment deals works out as advertised. “Chronic overallocation into real estate and bad private equity is the Number 1 problem [for athletes] in terms of a financial meltdown,” Butowsky says. “And I’ve never seen more people come to me about raising money for those kinds of deals than athletes.”

Doesn’t this sound like the current administration in microcosm?  Does Obama have any better chance with his GM investment?

The normal process for bureaucratic allocation of, say, highway funds, does not always work that well.  Seriously, you don’t have to convince this libertarian of that.  But it is at least intended to try to balance priorities and allocate the funds marginally rationally.   Which points out the problem with earmarks — they are overrides by Congress of the normal allocation and prioritization process for political ends.  By definition, the projects in earmarks would not have normally been funded by the usual operation of the prioritization process.

Which brings me, oddly enough, to AIG  (and to GM).  When companies can no longer meet all of their obligations, they generally file for chapter 11 bankruptcy. This is an extremely well-worn process, both in the courts and the business community, that attempts to save as much value as possible and to allocate that value, based on law and a set of rules everyone understands in advance, to the various stakeholders.   The folks who are involved in this process are pretty hard-headed folks, less out for revenge and retribution as for maintaining value and capturing as much as possible for whatever group one might represent.

Now Congress and the Administration are getting themselves involved in the bankruptcy process, by trying to avert actual chapter 11 filings by AIG and GM.  By doing so, they are effectively overriding the bankruptcy process.  Just as with earmarking, they claim this override is for some good of the country.  But, just as with earmarking, you can assume it is to benefit some politically-favored group.  At GM, the feds are saying that we don’t want employees or the equity holders to take a haircut, as they would in Chapter 11, so we will transfer the loss to taxpayers, and perhaps bondholders (could there be any politically less favored group than taxpayers?).  Same at AIG.   Is it any surprise that the number one beneficiary of the Pauslon bailout of AIG was Goldman Sachs?  The Left thought they smelled a rat when the administrations contracted with ex-Cheney-run Haliburton in Iraq, but no one is going to bat an eye when the Treasury department, populated with ex-Wall Street types, is bailing out all its employees’ old firms?

On the subject de jour, the AIG executive bonuses, many of these were just as guaranteed, contractually, as were payments on AIG policies and bond guarantees.  I don’t know how such obligations are treated in chapter 11 (are they treated as more or less senior than other obligations?) but I do know the decision to keep them or ditch them would be made against a goal of maintaining long-term value, and not public witch-hunting.

This is the real problem, even beyond the taxpayer cost, of this new form of Congressional or Administration-led pseudo-bankruptcy:  Winners and losers are determined by political power and perceptions of short-term political gain, rather than against a goal of maintaining value and following well understood and predictable rule.  This process throws all the old predictable rules and traditions out the window.  Investors and folks with contracts used to know just how senior their obligations were in a corporate failure.  Now, they have no idea, as their position in the bankruptcy may in the future depend more on how much they donated in the last presidential election, or how good their PR agent is.