Coyote Blog

From the AZ Republic:

GMAC, the former lending arm of General Motors Co., is in talks with the Treasury Department for a third injection of taxpayer aid, a further sign of the U.S. government’s entrenchment in the U.S. auto industry.

The Treasury Department mandated earlier this year that GMAC Financial Services raise an additional $11.5 billion in capital after undergoing a “stress test” along with 18 other banks. While other banks deemed undercapitalized have been able to raise funds from private investors, GMAC has been forced to go back to the government.

Maybe the reason no one but Obama will give GMAC any money is that they know that every time GMAC gets any money, it simply starts shoveling it at every car buyer who walks within shouting distance of a dealership and can fog a mirror.

Immediately after GMAC became eligible for TARP money, GM reduced to zero the interest rate… on certain models. …

GMAC has begun making loans to borrowers with credit scores as low as 621, a significant relaxation of the 700 minimum score the company adopted just three months ago as it struggled to survive. America’s median credit score is 723…

GMAC is a giant ponzi scheme to subsidize car sales.  Ponzi schemes last only so long as there is a sucker to keep putting in money.  No private funds are that dumb, but fortunately for GMAC there is the Obama administration.

From the Economist via TJIC:

the United Automobile Workers … can own half of Chrysler’s stock and a third of General Motors’ stock if everything goes through…

anti-labour activists might also feel a bit of cheer. As Conor Clarke points out, today’s events can only have one of two consequences:

It will change the incentives of the unions—such that they realize their demands were bad for the company—or it will run the company (further) into the ground and leave the union to pick up the pieces.

Worker ownership rarely works the way it’s expected, so it’s entirely possible that the UAW has sped up its own demise by cutting this deal.

I don’t have any hope that it will work out this way.  The only incentive alignment that will exist is that union ownership of GM will align Congressional incentives to issue GM a near infinite stream of subsidies, bailouts, tax breaks, import restrictions, consumer incentives, etc.

We are switching ownership of GM from a politically fragmented and unorganized group (ie current GM shareholders) to a single organization that already has political clout and massive political lobbying infrastructure  (UAW).  Just look at the large corporate states of France and Germany.  Union involvement in corporate management doesn’t change union practices, it changes government practices.

Update from Q&O:

There’s some interesting stuff out there to read about the Chrysler bankruptcy, like people asking “why wasn’t this done in the beginning”?

Simple answer – in the beginning there was no way to secure the UAW a majority stake in the company. Now, as Felix Salmon points out, that’s been accomplished

I am not shocked that Obama is full of sh*t –  all politicians are.  But I am constantly surprised at just how awful the press has become.

Here was the Arizona Republic towing the government line, attempting to stampede the country into subsidizing the auto companies because bankruptcy would be a disaster:

Advocates for the nation’s automakers are warning that the collapse of the Big Three – or even just General Motors – could set off a catastrophic chain reaction in the economy, eliminating up to 3 million jobs and depriving governments of more than $150 billion in tax revenue.

Industry supporters are offering such grim predictions as Congress weighs whether to bail out the nation’s largest automakers, which are struggling to survive the steepest economic slide in decades.

Even if just GM collapsed, the failure could bring down the other two companies – and even the U.S. operations of foreign automakers – as parts suppliers run out of money and shut down….

Automakers say bankruptcy protection is not an option because people would be reluctant to make long-term car and truck purchases from companies that might not last the life of their vehicles.

There was absolutely no background on the chapter 11 process, or any mention by this reporter or in any subsequent AZ Republic article that bankrupcy meant anything but liquidation and disaster. Not even a hint that many large companies, including the largest company based in Phoenix — US Airways — have operated seamlessly through chapter 11.

It was left to bloggers like myself to remind folks that the businesses and assets don’t just go *poof* in a bankruptcy, and in fact it is generally in creditors’ interests to have the company continue to operate.

So, now that Chrysler is heading for bankruptcy, Obama’s incentives are now to make chapter 11 look friendly instead of menacing.  And the AZ Republic is finally, after 6 months of coverage, explaining what this really means:

Bankruptcy doesn’t mean the nation’s No. 3 automaker will shut down. A Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing would allow a judge to decide how much the company’s creditors would get while the company continues to operate. The goal is for the whole process to happen quickly, Obama said, perhaps within a couple months.

I thought this was priceless:

[Obama] said a group of investment firms and hedge funds were holding out for the prospect of an unjustified taxpayer bailout.

“I don’t stand with them,” Obama said at the White House event.

I actually don’t think this is true — as secured creditors, they are FIRST in line in a bankruptcy.  Obama has effectively told them to voluntarily move to the back of the line, and they reasonably said “no way.”  Obama is miffed that they have not taken his royal direction, but I think they are correct they will get more out of a process run by bankruptcy law rather than one run by political pull.

But, even if hedge funds had this expectation of a taxpayer bailout, who in the hell do you think has given them reason to have this expectation?  Can anyone say “moral hazard?”

My kids have  a trick that I am sure is not unique to our household.  Faced with some type of food they do not like, they have become quite creative and artistic in spreading the mass of food around their plate, in a (generally) vain attempt to fool mom and dad that some of the food has disappeared.

After reading the scathing WSJ article this morning on the BofA / Merril Lynch deal, one has to wonder whether the feds were attempting the same trick with risk.

Like Welch, I welcome the WSJ as late arrivers to the bailout-skeptics party.

Via the WSJ

The Treasury Department has decided to extend bailout funds to a number of struggling life-insurance companies, helping an industry that is a linchpin of the U.S. financial system, people familiar with the matter said.

The department is expected to announce the expansion of the Troubled Asset Relief Program to aid the ailing industry within the next several days, these people said.

Seriously, how far does this go?  Does anyone else picture scores of brooms with pales of water exiting the Treasury building?  It’s like one of those farces where each new action to fix a crisis creates a new crisis that is even larger.

Kevin Drum quotes the Financial Times:

US banks that have received government aid, including Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan Chase, are considering buying toxic assets to be sold by rivals under the Treasury’s $1,000bn (£680bn) plan to revive the financial system.

….Wall Street executives argue that banks’ asset purchases would help achieve the second main goal of the plan: to establish prices and kick-start the market for illiquid assets.  But public opinion may not tolerate the idea of banks selling each other their bad assets. Critics say that would leave the same amount of toxic assets in the system as before, but with the government now liable for most of the losses through its provision of non-recourse loans.

Wow, no one could have predicted this.  Except for anyone who spent 5 minutes with the numbers:

There is an interesting incentive to collude [in the Geithner plan] between banks and investors.  The best outcome for both is for investors to pay a high price to banks and then have the bank kick back some portion to the investor.

I will confess that I did not take the next logical step and consider that the ultimate collusion would be for banks themselves to be the investors, but the incentives for doing so were dead clear (part 1, part 2).

I will stick by my original conclusion — Taxpayers are hosed at any price.

By the way, can anyone tell me what the evidence has been for the contention Barack Obama is “really smart,” because I sure don’t see it.  Yeah, he went to an Ivy League School, but so did I and there were plenty of people there I wouldn’t trust to run a lemonade stand.  Sure, he gives a nice prepared speech and seems to have invested in that vocabulary building course Rush Limbaugh used to peddle on his show, but what else?  All I see is a typical Ivy League denizen of some NGO who thinks he/she can change the world if only someone will listen to them, who just comes off as puerile if you really spend any time with them.  I will go back to what I wrote on inauguration day:

Folks are excited about Obama because, in essence, they don’t know what he stands for, and thus can read into him anything they want.  Not since the breathless coverage of Geraldo Rivera opening Al Capone’s vault has there been so much attention to something where we had no idea of what was inside.  My bet is that the result with Obama will be the same as with the vault.

I had someone ask me whether the results in this post on the economics of Geithner’s latest brainstorm were an artifact of the selected purchase price for the distressed asset of 150.  The answer is no.  Investors are willing to buy this asset on these terms at any price under 175, and banks are willing to sell for any price over 100.  Here is the graph of expected values as a function of the purchase price

Note the taxpayer gets hosed at any price  (kind of the Obama-Geithner update on “unsafe at any speed”)  Two things I had not realized before:

• Without competition among investors to drive up the price, a very large percentage of the taxpayer subsidy goes to the investors rather than the banks.
• There is an interesting incentive to collude here between banks and investors.  The best outcome for both is for investors to pay a high price to banks and then have the bank kick back some portion to the investor.

Russel Roberts deconstructs Obama’s auto speech.  Well worth the read.

I have worked with folks in the government for years.  One of the common syndromes I see in government officials of all levels is something I call “arrogant ignorance.”  I see a lot of it in this administration.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Obama has made an enormous blunder, driven in part by his best-and-the-brightest-style hubris, in taking personal ownership of GM.  Not because it will be an enormous waste of taxpayer money, because I don’t think he cares about a few tens of billions of our money.  It is a blunder because GM may not be fixable, and if it is salvageable in some smaller format, it will require painful compromises by politically powerful groups Obama really does not want to square off with.

Obama’s stepping forward and claiming ownership for GM’s success strikes me as roughly equivalent to someone stepping forward in March of 1945 to take ownership of the German war effort.   The decision is all the dumber because there was a perfectly good alternative — ie the bankrupcy courts — with far more experience (not to mention authority and legislative mandate) to handle these type of situations.

Megan McArdle has a good roundup of what challenges face GM and the Obamacrats.

Update: Obama seems to be hinting that a bankruptcy may still be in the cards.  The key challenge for him will be to deal with the obvious accusation of why he didn’t allow this before spending $20 billion or so of taxpayer money.  Expect the administration to be focus-grouping and trial-ballooning various euphamisms for chapter 11 to disguise this problem.

Critics of high executive pay on the soft-core / moderate left (as opposed to the hard-core socialist left) often argue that they are not against large incomes per se.  However, they argue that high executive pay is often the result of a failure in the structure of corporate governance, where a group of cozy insiders on the board and management hand each other compensation packages to which the rank and file of shareholders would be opposed  (a subset of the agency cost problem).

I am somewhat sympathetic to this argument, as I have personally observed instances where I thought boards and management were too cozy by far.  However, no one has really succeeded at proving this hypothesis on executive pay, and in fact shareholders when they have had a chance to vote on such packages have never really made a meaningful dent in them, and one can find a number of private companies where such governance issues presumably don’t exist but high executive compensation packages can exist.

Just as an aside, a classic example of this can be found in the fabulous book “Barbarians at the Gate” about the RJR Nabisco takeover fight.  The book does a great job of portraying a company with horrible corporate governance issues that seemed to be used to enrich managers with both salaries and perks, but then observed that the new private owners of the company gave their new CEO a compensation package that might have made the previous executives blush.

Anyway, I am yet again off the point.  My point was to observe that the mainstream left seems to believe that there are corporate governance issues at large corporations that disenfranchise the majority of shareholders vis a vis key decisions involving the company executives.  So I have to ask myself, if this is a real fear, then how does one justify having the President of the United States effectively fire the GM CEO, without any vote or substantial input from shareholders?

Postscript: It is all well and good to be cognizant of agency costs.  Everyone should understand when an employee (or contractor or whatever) has different incentives than they themselves possess.  For example, on my recent backyard renovation, I always kept in mind that my architect wanted to create a showplace that would advance his business and possible get into a magazine.  In general, this alligns our interests, but there were times he pressed for things I did not value and I had to be insistent we were not going to do those things.

However, many folks seem to want to run off to government to do something about agency costs whenever or wherever they are found.  This is hugely dangerous, as Congress tends to have the highest agency costs one will ever be likely to find.

The Liberty Papers thinks we have become a lawless Banana Republic.  George Will is thinking along the same lines, snarkily observing that Sweden, China, and Mexico have all observed in one way or another that the Feds seem to be acting outside the rule of law.

I have opined in the past that what really extended the Great Depression was not any real underlying economic issue, or even vast increases in government spending per se.  It was that arbitrariness with which the Roosevelt administration dealt with economic matters.  With nutty programs like the Mussolini-inspired National Industrial Recovery Act coming and going, investors and businesses never knew from day to day what the rules of the game would be next year, or even next week.

I fear that this is exactly the climate Obama and Congress are creating today.

• When Congress reacts to CNN headlines by retroactively confiscating legal compensation that it had protected just weeks before, what will happen to my compensation?
• When government deficits soar by trillions of dollars, what will taxes look like next year?
• When the Administration says that Co2 will have to be reduced by 80%, what numbers do I plug into my forecasts for fuel and electricity?
• When the government decides on a whim to print a trillion dollars more money to pay off government debt, what will inflation look like in the coming months and years?

As of two months ago, my company was still investing.  We were still getting bank credit, particularly for equipment financing, though it took more work than in the past to secure it.  We still saw opportunity in our business, and in fact saw increased opportunity in the recession for low-cost recreation options and outsourcing of public recreation facilities.

But today, I am reluctant to make any new investments.  Investing $5000 now for $8,000 a year from now normally sounds good, but what happens now that the Feds have more than doubled the money supply?  How much will $8,000 really be worth a year from now?  What will my taxes be on the increase?**  What new costs or liabilities  might be retroactively placed on me for making the investment?  What happens if beltway pundits start thinking I am making too much money?

All this commotion of government intervention started when Paulson and other Bush appointees started screaming that the banking system was going to shut down and therefore crash the whole economy.  As my readers know, I believe to this day that this was all sky-is-falling over-reaction and panic-mongering, and most of the credit crunch resulted from uncertainty about the Treasury and its statements, not due to realities on the ground.   However, whatever tightening of credit we might or might not have avoided by government action, it pales in its effect on investment in comparison to the arbitrariness and trillion-dollar-plan-of-the-day that has been the first 60 days of the Obama administration.

** footnote: For those of you who have not lived through high inflation times, taxes and inflation are a deadly combination.  That is because the Federal Government, after creating inflation, then taxes each of us on its effects.  Here is an example:  Invest $5000 now at a fixed 10% a year.  Suddenly, inflation goes up to 8% a year.  In five years, I now have a bit over $8000.  In economic terms I have made a small profit of, since $8000 in five years at 8% inflation is worth $5,445 today.

But the IRS thinks I have made $3000, not just $445, and will tax me on the full $3000.  If they take a third, I only have $7000 at the end, or $4,764 in current dollars, meaning that after taxes, I actually lost money.

As has been the case for decades (the gun-to-the-head federal strategy to force 55 mph speed limits and seat belt laws come to mind), the feds are sending money to the states with many strings attached.  Apparently, Arizona is running afoul of one of those provisions:

Arizona’s receipt of $1.6 billion in stimulus funding, including more than $300 million already being spent to help keep the state in the black, is at risk because a federal agency says the state is not in compliance with a prohibition against health-care rollbacks.

Arizona could lose the money if the federal determination stands or if state law isn’t changed to eliminate a health-care requalification provision that was the basis of the determination, state officials said Monday.

According to Brewer’s letter, the agency determined that the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System’s requirement that some enrollees requalify every six months instead of annually violated a stimulus-program prohibition against tightened eligibility standards, methodologies or procedures for a state’s Medicaid program.

There is something supremely irritating about Federal bailouts to states that are tied to restrictions that make it more difficult for states to close their budget shortfalls on their own.  It’s almost as if Congress wants to institutionalize dependency on the Feds  (where have we seen that before?)

Apparently, in the spirit of the retroactive tax-taking of the AIG deferred compensation payments, the restrictions are retroactive to state actions taken as early as July 1, 2008, meaning that Obama is asking states to roll back legislation that was passed months before he was even elected as a condition of getting the cash.

The actions causing problems for Arizona occurred in September, 2008, and were, according to our governor, the result of legislation passed in June of 2008.

via Paul Kedrosky (click to enlarge)

I guess the disputed $175 million in deferred compensation payments should be on here as well, though the line would be too infinitesimally thin to draw.   The CDS stuff gets the attention, but the securities guarantees are the largest flow.  Are these guarantees of traded securities, like bonds and equities?  If so, it sure is a happy notion for all of us taxpayers with portfolios that are well under water that we are going to send some of our money to help bail out the losses in the Goldman Sachs portfolio.

A couple of questions about AIG:

1.  Is there any real legal difference between the contractual commitment by AIG to pay bonuses to employees and their contractual commitment to pay off mortgage bond guarantees to companies like Goldman Sachs? **

2.  In a bankruptcy, how senior would contractual promises of deferred compensation to employees be?  Everyone comes after the government, of course, but would such claims be more or less senior to, say, commitments to pay counter-parties?

** before claiming one commitment was outrageous and unjustified, one needs to be clear which commitment he is referring to, since both commitments in retrospect seem crazy to me.  It is just that one party (ie Goldman Sachs), which has the added advantage of being represented by many of its former employees in the Treasury department, has convinced Congress and the Administration that not paying them carries systemic risk to the economy.

That seems to be the new key to government largess:  Carrying systemic risk.  It used to be one wanted to be poor or female or black to merit special consideration in the government spending sweepstakes.  But nowadays, in our post-racial society, the key is to be the one who can wrap himself in the flag of “systemic risk.”  Here is AIG’s entry into the “we have systemic risk, so give us taxpayer money” essay contest.

Thomas Sowell, via Carpe Diem:

The current political stampede to stop mortgage foreclosures proceeds as if foreclosures are just something that strikes people like a bolt of lightning from the blue– and as if the people facing foreclosures are the only people that matter.
What if the foreclosures are not stopped? Will millions of homes just sit empty? Or will new people move into those homes, now selling for lower prices– prices perhaps more within the means of the new occupants?

The same politicians who have been talking about a need for “affordable housing” for years are now suddenly alarmed that home prices are falling. How can housing become more affordable unless prices fall?

The political meaning of “affordable housing” is housing that is made more affordable by politicians intervening to create government subsidies, rent control or other gimmicks for which politicians can take credit. Affordable housing produced by market forces provides no benefit to politicians and has no attraction for them.

In the wake of the housing debacle in California, more people are buying less expensive homes, making bigger down payments, and staying away from “creative” and risky financing (see chart above). It is amazing how fast people learn when they are not insulated from the consequences of their decisions.

Tigerhawk asks:

If the CEOs of banks that take federal money, including those who took federal money only after Hank Paulsen essentially ordered them, have their salary capped at $500,000, under what principle do we allow universities that request federal funding to pay their own presidents much more money? Is there a rational basis for the distinction, or is it simply that the Democrats do not want to go after one of their most important constituents?

Forget about the university presidents, what about the football coaches?  One Hundred Billion dollar banks can’t pay their CEO’s or deal-makers more than $500,000, but state-run football programs can pay their coaches $ 4 million dollars?

Once upon a time, most entrepreneurs organized their business as what is called a C-Corporation.  Most of the publicly traded corporations you can think of, from Avon to Zenith, are essentially C-Corporations.   Such corporations had any number of advantages, but they had (and still have) one big, big disadvantage.  C-Corporations paid federal income taxes at the corporate tax rates.  And then, if after-tax profits were dividended to owners, those dividends would be taxed again.  This double taxation of earnings is something Congress talks about all the time, but never does much about.  And the implicit government tax subsidy for debt over equity does a lot to explain various waves of merger and LBO activity we have seen since the 1980’s.

Now, entrepreneurs were not stupid.  No one wants their hard-earned income taxed twice.   So, entrepreneurs who owned C-corps would do one of two things.  One approach was to have the owner pay himself a large salary, thus reducing corporate income and converting the dividends to more tax-advantaged wages.  The other approach was to have the company issue the owner loans rather than dividends.  I have seen many closely-held C-corps with huge accumulated corporate loans to their owners, which may only be unwound years or decades later when the company is sold or liquidated and profits can be taken out a lower capital gains rates.

Over the last 20 years or so, a new corporate vehicle called the sub-chapter S or S-corp has become popular.  With a few limitations, the S-corp offers all the same liability protections as a C-corp, with a big tax advantage:  S-corps are not subject to corporate taxes — corporate profits of the owners flow straight through the corporation to the owners’ 1040 personal returns, eliminating any double taxation  (Limited Liability Corps or LLC’s operate roughly the same, but with slightly different rules).  For this reason they are also sometimes called pass-through entities.

It is interesting to note something I never hear mentioned when discussing aggregate personal income data, which is that the switch over time from entrepreneurs using the C-corp to the S-corp creates something of a discontinuity in the income data.  Thirty years ago, much of the annual corporate earnings, and all of the retained earnings, of business owners would not show up in the IRS personal income data  — it shows up as corporate income, but not personal income.  Today, nearly all of that corporate income of small business owners shows up as regular income on personal tax returns.  Absent any other changes in income trends, business owners as a group will appear to have large increases in taxable income, when in fact economically nothing may have changed save the corporate structures of their businesses.

But the real point I want to make is that all of the retained income and potential investment capital of a small business using S-corps or LLCs (which is nearly everyone nowadays)  shows up on the owner’s personal income tax returns.  Let’s hypothesize an entrepreneur whose S-corp earns $250,000 in profits after-tax.  Let’s say he typically puts $150,000 of that to savings and living expenses, and the other $100,000 is reinvested in the growth and/or productivity of the business.  Now let’s look at proposed increases in upper income tax brackets.  With these higher proposed rates, the business owner will have less than $250,000 in after tax income.  Let’s say it goes down to $220,000.  Odds are that the owner will retain his lifestyle (he will as a minimum still have the same size mortgage and school and other payments).  The slack, then, comes out of the retained earnings.  Essentially, higher taxes result in less investment capital.  In fact, we can see an increased tax rate on wealthier entrepreneurs and business owners could easily result in a dollar for dollar reduction in business investment among small businesses, acknowledged to be the place where most all new jobs are created.

I think readers know that I don’t fully accept the Obama administration’s analysis of this recession.  However, let’s take them at face value for a moment.  They are concerned that savings of average people won’t currently translate into more business investment, as they fear the credit crisis causes banks to hold the savings rather than re-lend it.  If this were the case, then it would mean that as a policy, we would want to preferentially route tax savings to entrepreneurs and business owners who invest their own money directly, because their is no intermediary of a bank to interfere with the process.  But in fact, this is exactly opposite of what the Obama administration is doing through tax policy, instead taking away the investment capital and retained earnings of entrepreneurs through higher taxes.

This is the European-style corporate state in a nutshell.  In Europe, entrepreneurship is made extraordinarily difficult.  This is part of the deal that the political elite have with the largest companies in their countries — we will protect you from potential new competitors, we will bail you out when times get tough, and you in turn will support us politicians.  One only has to look at the turnover of the top 30 companies in the US since 1970 vs. the top 30 in Germany or France to see this at work.  Political turnover is even slower, as an elite group of ministers run the country, almost no matter the party voted in office.  The economy as a whole suffers, but for the top 1000 or so men in power, the system works to protect their position, be it in government or in the largest industries.

And now we bring this system to the US.  Small business owners and entrepreneurs are punished with higher taxes in order to bail out politically powerful but failing companies like GM or Citicorp.  Welcome to America, the new corporate state.

Postscript: A lot of folks erroneously associate corporate states with right-wing governments, and certainly that was the case in Mussolini’s Italy.  But the closest brush the US has ever had with such a system (prior to today) was implemented by leftish FDR via the National Industrial Recovery Act, and governments of both left and right have supported the corporate state approach of France and Germany.  In Britain, it was the left that built the corporate state and the right, under Thatcher, who tore it down.

Remember that time, after the Enron bankruptcy, when gas trading and transportation came to a halt in the US?  Or when air transportation ground to halt after Frontier, ATA, Aloha, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways all filed for bankruptcy in a 3 year period?  Or when half of California lost power when PG&E went bankrupt?  Or when car production came to a halt when parts supplier Delphi went into Chapter 11?

Yeah, neither do I.  That’s because we have a system, that works pretty well and is certainly well-rehearsed, for corporate bankruptcies.  And the number 1 design consideration of this system, the most important assumption behind the whole process, is that creditors will ultimately get more value if the company continues to operate.

GM has painted a picture that the US automotive industry will come to an end if they have to declare bankruptcy.  This is complete BS.  As I wrote the other day, this is an effort by management and certain other constituencies (labor, equity holders) to get the government to intervene not because it is better for the country or the industry, but because it promises to advance their interests at the ultimate expense of taxpayers and bondholders.  This is a power play.  Holders of the senior debt have the power and call the tune in Chapter 11.  If management can get Obama and Congress to substitute themselves for a Chapter 11 judge, then management can hold onto their power.

I feel like the press has done little to call BS on this whole argument, and has generally supported the auto company narrative  (don’t discount the fact that auto dealers are the #1 advertisers, by far, in local TV stations and newspapers).  But I was happy to see this in the WSJ, via Carpe Diem:

GM continues to argue that it couldn’t survive a Chapter 11 proceeding, but the truth is that bankruptcy could boost its ability to survive. As the Obama administration considers its response to GM’s request for more cash, it should be mindful of the advantages of bankruptcy that haven’t been highlighted — certainly not by GM’s management.

GM executives have been saying that in Chapter 11 its network of suppliers would collapse, dragging down the rest of the auto industry with their company. But Chapter 11 has well-established procedures to deal with this concern.

Bankruptcy may be the only way for GM to fully confront its operational problems, deal with its legacy costs, reconfigure its dealer network, and achieve a viable labor agreement.

But one issue that has not been discussed much is that bankruptcy usually leads to a sharp change in management. There are turnaround teams expert at restructuring troubled companies, and they may well be more effective than GM’s current management. It’s no surprise GM’s management isn’t advertising this fact, but taxpayers and the government should know about it.

In the end, the administration needs to keep in mind that vital elements in GM’s restructuring — recapitalizing its large bond debt and keeping what cash it has flowing to key suppliers — are often dealt with successfully by bankruptcy courts. A bankruptcy could save GM — though maybe not its management.

I just skimmed through Obama’s speech.  I am not particularly good at parsing this political stuff, so I won’t.  The speech had a lot of the typical politician’s assertions about features of his programs that have no basis in their actual design.  For example, he asserts that home bailout money won’t go to the irresponsible, but there is no such design element in his actual plan (homeowners are eligible for bailouts based on various hard-wired value formulas and ratios — there is no step where their motivation for becoming overextended is or even could be assessed, nor any step where the government may exercise discretion).

Anyway, the one overriding sense I got from reading the speech was that I was totally correct when I wrote this:

So you ask, will we get any stimulative effect?  I would answer:  Just one.  Obama and Congress will now shut the hell up trying to panic everyone into battening down the hatches for the worst economy in history, and folks can get a bit of breathing space to look around them and see that business opportunity is still there.  This is $800 billion in hush money, a bribe we are paying Obama and Pelosi in the form of passing a lot of their pent up leftish wish list, in return for them taking some ownership interest in real economic health.

Cooler heads are looking at the world economic data, and starting to come to the conclusion, voiced by yours truly a number of times, that the US financial crisis was/is a symptom of a world economic slowdown, not the other way around

Compare the decline in real GDP over the past 4 quarters (from The Economist):

U.S.	-0.2%
France	-1.0
Germany	-1.6
Britain	-1.8
Italy	-2.6
Japan	-4.6

Does it make sense to blame the largest declines in GDP on one country with the smallest decline?  If so, then we need some explanation of how some uniquely American “illness has spread” to so many innocent victims.

If the explanation is supposed to be falling U.S. imports, then the worst decline by far would have been in Canada and Mexico (where real GDP was rising even in the third quarter).  If the alleged causality is supposed to be because of some undefined links between financial centers, then Italy would not be among the hardest hit.

When it comes to trade, in fact, the shoe is mainly on the other foot: Collapsing foreign economies crushed U.S. exports.

In the second quarter of 2008, U.S. exports accounted for 1.54 percentage points of the 2.83% annualized rise in real GDP.  But falling exports subtracted 2.84 percentage points from fourth quarter GDP.  Falling exports, not falling consumption, were the biggest single contributor to the overall drop of 3.8%.

After looking at which economies fell first and fastest, it might be more accurate to say that some foreign  illness has spread to the U.S. economy than to assert or assume the causality ran only in the opposite direction.

The Chrysler web page for their restructuring plan they presented to the Feds is here.  The summary pdf my comments are based on is here.  Thoughts:

1. It is criminal that this is going to Congress, not a bankruptcy judge.  This is a conspiracy of management (looking to hold onto their jobs and equity), equity holders, and employees to usurp value from the senior debt holders, who would normally be first in line in a bankruptcy.
2. There is no WAY I, as a private investor, would put one additional dime into Chrysler based on this plan.  All the Same-Old-Incremental-Sh*t, with no explanation of what they are going to do differently.   Somehow they are going to cut half their models and lay off tens of thousands of employees but hold fast on market share, somehow reversing years of steady decline.  No explanation of how.
3. In section one, they blame it all on the credit markets.  Specifically, the lack of ability of the Chrysler finance arm to lend to customers.  But I showed the other day that consumer lending is still strong by banks.  What they are really saying here, but they are smart enough not to utter the actual words, is that their sales depended on a finance arm that was willing to lend at below-market rates to people with bad credit scores, and the lack of this hidden subsidy is what is making it hard to sell their cars.  Credit exists — what no longer exists is zero-percent-interest-to-anyone-who-walks-in-the-door-no-questions-asked financing.   Instead of figuring out how to make cars that don’t require hidden subsidies to get off the lot, they are trying to get the government to fund their hidden subsidies.
4. The present value calculation is a joke.  I could spend 3-4 business school classes discussing problems with it, so I won’t now.  But one element that stuck out at me was that they come up with a terminal value in the calculation as a multiple of EBITDA  (Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization).  Really?  EBITDA is a common metric, but it is beyond meaningless when looking at a company going bankrupt under the weight of interest costs and capital spending.  Besides, they have the gall to assume that net cash flow (excluding financing activities) will be positive for the combined years 2009-2010.  Im-freaking-possible.  Remember, if any private investor in the country believed these numbers, Chrysler wouldn’t have to be begging at Congress’s door.  Congress is their last chance to find a sucker who will give them more money.
5. OK, I can’t totally leave aside the NPV calculations yet.  They have a table of NPV’s at different rates of return  (which is meaningless because their cash flow assumptions can’t be believed).  The rates of return are 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%.  This is ridiculous, though many may not recognize it.   20% is a low rate for the discounting of about any large equity investment, but it is absurdly, ridiculously low for a high-risk investment in a company that has been burning cash for decades and is facing its second near bankrupcy in 30 years.  Any savvy investor in the world would smell a dead fish here, but Congress won’t because Chrysler is waiving electric cars at them
6. And speaking of electric cars, any intelligent restructuring plan would recognize that electric cars, even if they are successful in the marketplace, are not going to be anything but a cash drain for years.  This kind of thing has to be put on hold while the company gets back on its feet.  But instead, since this is a political and not a business document, Chrysler is practically leading with it.  In fact, the sections “4:  Commitment to Energy Security and Environmental Sustainability”, “5:  Compliance with Fuel Economy Regulations,” and “6:  Compliance with Emissions Regulations” all come in priority order ahead of “7: Achieving a Competitive Product Mix and Cost Structure.”  In fact, this section about costs and competitive products comes dead last in the plan.  LOL, a “business” plan, indeed.
7. I thought it was funny that on the cover of the report, they have all kinds of happy politician-grabbing stats about how many red-blooded Americans they employ and how much of their production is made in the good old USA.  But their entire restructuring plank #3, which is labeled “strategic alliances,” seems to boil down to a bunch of outsourcing to foreign partners.  Which is fine with me, but probably would freak out the Dems they are selling it to should they figure it out.

In the new corporate state, this is what business plans will look like.  Because were aren’t selling returns and wise investment of capital, we are selling the care and feeding of political constituencies and pressure groups.

Postscript: OK, I realize I criticized the plan without suggesting what should be in it.  Here is what I would demand as an investor:  An achnowlegement and discussion of the reasons for past market share slide, and targeted actions to reverse these trends.  As Chrysler has said they have been working on this problem for 30+ years, the proposed solutions will need to sound radical, not incremental.  Further, they need to stop complaining that below-market rate consumer financing does not exist, and explain how they are going to sell cars at a price that covers their costs as well as a return for shareholders.

Well, while I was gone this week, GM asked the government for another $21.6 billion, on top of the $17.4 billion taxpayers handed them just two months ago.   Reading between the lines of GM statements, it is probably not crazy to assume they are burning cash at the rate of $5-$8 billion a month, which means this new infusion would likely get the company only through May or June.  This burn rate should not be surprising, as GM was burning $2.5 billion a month before the recession even really started, and they have really done nothing substantial to restructure the company.  By throwing the company to Congress to help save its managers and equity holders, the company has subjected its restructuring not to hard-headed bondholder representatives in a bankrupcy, but to the vagaries of the political process:

When the president’s auto task force meets today to begin trying to fix the broken U.S. auto companies, it must balance dozens of competing demands.

Yeah, I am sure that will go well.  GM can have its money as long as it puts a factory in West Virginia and names it after Robert Byrd. The bondholders are pissed, as well they should be.  The senior debt holders have first claim in a bankruptcy, so another way to look at this political process is that it is the action of all the other constituents of GM (employees, equity holders, managers) who are trying to get Congress to interrupt the typical subordination of interests in a bankruptcy and allow them to get ahead of the senior debt holders in the line for what limited value remains in GM’s shell.

I am tired of Keynsians and their assumptions setting the tone of the economic debate.  Here is the question I would ask them:

I understand that you Keynsians think that there are under-employed assets in the country, and that you think the government can redeploy prvate investment capital to more productive use.

Ignoring the individual liberties issues assosiated with this approach, as well as the fact it has never worked in the past, answer me this:  How are we going to turn around the economy by forcing capital to flow to the assets, industries, and management teams that have proven themselves to be the least productive?

We send money preferentially to the industry (autos) that has been showing some of the worst returns on capital in the entire country, and in particular to the company (GM) that has performed the worst in the industry.  If we really wanted to create auto jobs, wouldn’t we send the money to the company that has historically invested money the most productively? It would be as if venture capitalists were about to complete their 27th round of financing to keep Pets.com afloat.  I have been in a company that eventually failed and couldn’t get new financing.  At the time we were trying to convince the investors that they should give us just one more round, one more chance to prove the thing out.  In retrospect, I am embarrased they funded us as long as they did.  They should have pulled the plug way earlier.  Investors have a saying “your first loss is your best loss.”

And don’t even get me started on housing.  A deader, less productive investment asset can’t possibly be identified.  A million bucks spent on a house produces 30 jobs for 6 months.  A million bucks spent on a factory expansion produces 30 jobs indefinitely.  For years, Democrats have hammered the Republicans over the jobless recovery of this decade, which in fact has shown a fairly unique jobs profile.  I wonder how much of this could be traced to the myriad incentives that were put in place to pour our available capital into these dead assets?  And now, with the bailout and the new mortgage bailout, the government is investing even more money to prop up the value of these non-productive investments.

It has been interesting to watch the reaction to Obama’s mortgage-holder bailout.  Certainly the plan is expensive, likely largely ineffective, and has terrible long-term impacts on incentives.   To my libertarian eyes the plan is awful, but no more awful, and actually less expensive (incredibly!) than other bailouts and legislation pouring out of Washington of late.  Like everything else we are seeing, it is a hair-of-the-dog plan:  fix government over-promotion of home ownership with more government promotion of home ownership;  Fix the fact that individuals are over-leveraged by trying to keep them in their mortgages.

But this issue changes the political map to some extent.  The usual rhetoric about milking one group to help another who are “on the outs by no fault of their own” is just stretched past credulity on this one.  Sure, there are enough folks who were really tricked or scammed in their mortgages to fill up any length of a news segment with tearful anecdotes.  But the 50% of the country that rents or the large percentage of homeowners that didn’t chase around after zero-down house-flipping deals don’t seem to be buying that their tax money is now flowing to innocent victims.

Postscript:  I know there is a tendency to leap onto this “fraud” excuse to help assuage one’s ego.  Yeah, I wasn’t stupid, I was tricked!  Well, I am in some financial tough times, and I will declare it here publicly:  It is all my fault.   I got overly exuberant in expanding the business, and doubled down on my mistake by agreeing to a large financial commitment based on a bank’s loan commitment letter, rather than an actual loan (a commitment letter that was pretty much worthless as the bank went into FDIC receivership).   I have found, by the way, that my banks have been very reasonable about restructuring commitments as long as I come to the table with a plan showing how I intend to pay them back every cent that is theirs  (yes, I said it, it is theirs – it is their money) though just with altered terms and timing.  The good news is that a ebbing tide reveals a lot of rocks, and the business has been vastly improved by the thorough review and restructuring we have put it through of late.

October 2008 was a failure of nerve.  As so often happens, folks who normally support letting failing institutions fail when times are good tend to lose their nerve when the crisis is at hand, and find some way to convince themselves that somehow, this time is unique and different.  But it is not.   Only later is there remorse.  I won’t want to pick on Megan McArdle too much, if for no other reason than she is generally the first person on the planet to admit she is wrong, but you can start to see some of the remorse here:

We’re now making many of the mistakes that Japan did.  I know, I know–I supported TARP I.  But I did so because at the time, there seemed to be a reasonable possibility that the funds could stop a liquidity crisis from turning into a solvency crisis.  But if liquidity crises go on long enough, they become solvency crises, so whatever we had then, we now have a badly crippled banking system.  More of the same isn’t going to help.

We need a plan that is going to force the banks to recognize and write down their bad loans, restructure dysfunctional borrowers, shut down the banks that are too far gone, and inject substantial capital into the banks that are strong enough to pull through.  But that kind of radical action is scary.  And whether they decide to do it by nationalizing bad banks, or by injecting capital into good ones, the political cost is going to be very high.  So we get baby steps and vague promises of major leaps forward down the road.

Another political problem is that recapitalizing the banking system involves, in the initial stage, conserving capital (read: cutting credit limits), and writing down bad loans means unpopular actions like restructuring failing companies (read:  layoffs) and foreclosing on hopeless borrowers.  One of the major arguments against bank nationalization is that a government-owned bank will find it harder, not easier, to do those things.  The temptation to keep large employers on life support will be large, and every congressman will have a list of firms in their district that can’t be allowed to go bust.

I have tried to have this and other bailout arguments with a number of folks.  This is often a hard conversation, because people have trouble separating in their minds the productive assets of these companies (factories, investments, systems, deposits, trained people) from the institution itself.  So when we talk of bankruptcy of, say, GM, they think if GM goes poof, then all those factories and cars go poof.

But that is absurd.  Remember the huge gas shortages that resulted from the loss of the Enron gas trading desk and transportation infrastructure when Enron went bust?  Yeah, neither do I.  That’s because all of Enron’s productive assets flowed through the well understood chapter 11 (or was Enron Chapter 7) process to new owners.

By the way, by management, I mean something broader than just the CEO or the top tier of managers:

A corporation has physical plant (like factories) and workers of various skill levels who have productive potential.  These physical and human assets are overlaid with what we generally shortcut as “management” but which includes not just the actual humans currently managing the company but the organization approach, the culture, the management processes, its systems, the traditions, its contracts, its unions, the intellectual property, etc. etc.  In fact, by calling all this summed together “management”, we falsely create the impression that it can easily be changed out, by firing the overpaid bums and getting new smarter guys.  This is not the case – Just ask Ross Perot.  You could fire the top 20 guys at GM and replace them all with the consensus all-brilliant team and I still am not sure they could fix it.

Bankruptcy is a scary term, but here is what makes it beautiful — it takes assets out of the hands of failed management, failed business plans, failed management cultures, etc. and puts those assets in the hands of new owners and managers.  These new owners and managers are not guaranteed to be better at managing the assets, but the odds are they will be since the performance bar set by the last management team is by definition so low (ie, they went bankrupt!)

When we interrupt the bankruptcy process and bail out a failing company, we do two things:

• We leave the productive assets of the company in the hands of the same failing management (again, with this term defined broadly as above) that got the company into the current straights, rather than putting the assets in the hands of new owners
• We focus the country’s limited investment capital (via taxes or government borrowing that crowds out private borrowers) towards what are by definition among the worst managed institutions in the country.   If someone asked you to invest a billion dollars either in the top 10 most successful companies or the bottom 10 least successful, where would you put the money to create the most jobs and growth?  In the top 10, right?  But the government is doing EXACTLY the opposite.

Here is the true economic miracle of the 80’s and 90’s:  Not Reagan’s tax cuts or Clinton’s economic plan or Alan Greenspan in the Fed.  It was the fact that the government, with the American economy sweating under some very difficult conditions (worse than they are today, but you would never know it in the press) and under strong threats from Japan and Europe, basically did … nothing.  There was all kinds of pressure to create an American MITI  (seriously, it seems like a joke today, but the push was strong).  We did not.  The American economy was allowed to restructure itself.

This is why our recessions tend to be shorter than those in Japan and Europe.  These other economies are generally more of a corporate state, with a major goal of the government to maintain the incumbents in the corporate world.   I would argue that the key determinants to recovering from a recession quickly are asset, capital, and labor mobility.  Japan has many structural limitations on these, and it dragged their recession out for years.  In the name of trying to avoid the problems Japan has faced, we are repeating the exact same mistakes.  Every step we have taken so far to deal with the “crisis” have reduced the asset, capital, and labor mobility the economy needs to right itself.

We will be posting on the stimulus bill for months and years, because it will take that long to figure out what was in it.  Congressman who voted for it may never know what they actually voted for.  Veronique de Rugy takes a first swing at it:

Total spending amounts to $792 billion, with $570 billion in direct spending and $212 billion in tax provisions. These numbers don’t include the massive amount of interest that will accrue on the increased debt. If we include that, the total amount comes to $1.14 trillion.

Supporters of the package describe the legislation as transportation and infrastructure investment, the idea being to use new spending to put America back to work while at the same time fixing decrepit infrastructure. However, only 17 percent of the discretionary spending in this package is for infrastructure items. More worrisome still, the final version lacks any mechanism to ensure that spending will be targeted toward infrastructure projects with high economic returns

De Rugy actually overestimates the infrastructure spending, because she looks at the spending over 10 years.  Since the stimulative effect of infrastructure spending in this recession is, at most, limited to 2009-2010 spending, and since the infrastructure spending is more back-end loaded, the percentage is much lower in the first 2 years — something like 6-7% as I calculated here (I will go back through the CBO reports with an update when I get a chance, but Kevin Drum links them here, hilariously saying they “scored well.”

Unfortunately, even this seems to wildly underestimate the true cost of the bill.  In creating the bill, Congress increased the general operating funds for zillions of departments and programs  (remember, 80+% of the spending is departmental budget increases, not infrastructure construction).  However, they show these increasing disappearing after a couple of years.  We all know that Democrats consider removing an increase to be “a massive cut” so we can assume that at some point, these budget increases will be extended for eternity.  If one makes this more realistic assumption, then the cost of the stimulus bill is over $3 trillion!  [update:  Carpe Diem demonstrates this with a nice set of graphs]

My other project I am working on is to look at some of the “shovel ready” projects on the mayor’s list here  (warning!  600 page pdf!!) in the Phoenix area.  My incoming hypothesis is that any project on here either:

1. Is not shovel ready, as it takes years to get a project through planning, procurement, and environmental permitting, but once anyone in DC finds that out, they won’t take back the money, -OR-
2. Is something that the local residents, who will enjoy the benefit, refused to fund, raising the question as to why the rest of us should fund it.

I won’t spill the beans yet, but here are a few tastes from the Phoenix area:

• A major upgrade to the water system of the town of Paradise Valley, a small community embedded in Phoenix which is, by a fairly good margin, the single wealthiest zip code in the state.
• A lot of solar.  Solar is a particularly good choice for this list because 1)  Obama has a hard-on for it, so he is unlikely to question it  2)  Solar’s problem is high capital cost vs. the amount of electricity produced, but if someone else is paying the capital cost….