Pretty amazing footage. Having been to the Brandenburg Gate during the height of the Cold War, it is jarring to see someone driving easily from the British to the Soviet sector (the wall ran right by the Gate, with it just in the Soviet sector).
Archive for the ‘History’ Category.
I wanted to add something to my post on Hiroshima the other day. The point of the post was not to argue for any comfort with atomic weapons or the killing of tens of thousands of civilians (mutual assured destruction has got to be the dumbest, scariest, craziest basis for international relations ever conceived). The point was to argue that most arguments about Hiroshima are stripped of historical context, colored by our experience of the Cold War, and based on increasingly popular but incorrect assumptions about the rulers of Japan at the end of the war.
So as an adjunct to that post, I wanted to emphasize that I think civilian bombing (whether conventional or nuclear) to be the worst single new idea of the 20th century. The absolute worst ideas of the 20th century were likely Marxism and genocide, but these were not new to the 2oth century. But strategic bombing of civilian populations far to the rear of the front lines, whether convention or nuclear, by airplane or missile, was almost entirely new. It was an awful, terrible idea that haunts us to this day.
It is in this context that I don't single out Hiroshima for particular opprobrium. It was a change in technology in a horrendous program. The worst of the lot in my mind was Arthur Harris. Harris, head of the British strategic bombing effort through most of the war, did not even pretend to be targeting industries or factories. He thought such precision bombing to be madness. His very specific goal was to kill and "unhouse" as many civilians as possible, and he measured the British bombing effort in those terms.
Well, its that time of year again and folks on the Left are out there with their annual rants against the bombing of Hiroshima as a great crime against humanity.
All war is a crime against humanity by those who start them. And I am certainly uncomfortable that we let the atomic genie out of the steel casing in August of 1945. But I think much of what is written about Hiroshima strips the decision to drop the bomb from its historical context. A few thoughts:
- We loath the Hiroshima bombing because we in 2015 know of the nuclear proliferation that was to follow and the resulting cloud of fear that hung over the globe for decades as most everyone was forced to think about our new ability to destroy humanity. But all that was in the realm of science fiction in 1945. And even if they knew something of the Cold War and fear of the Bomb, would many have had sympathy, living as they were through a real war that represented possibly the worst self-inflicted catastrophe man has ever faced?
- Several other bombing raids, notably the fire-bombing of Tokyo, took more lives than Hiroshima. Again, we differentiate the two because we experienced the Cold War that came after and thus developed a special fear and loathing for atomic weapons, but people in 1945 did not have that experience.
- The ex post facto mistake many folks make on Hiroshima is similar to the mistake many of us make on Yalta. Lots of folks, particularly on the Right, criticize FDR for being soft on Stalin and letting him get away with Eastern Europe. But really,what were they going to do? Realistically, Russia's armies were already in Eastern Europe and were not going to leave unless we sent armies to throw them out. Which we were not, because folks were absolutely exhausted by the war. This war exhaustion also plays a big part in the decision at Hiroshima. Flip the decision around. What would have happened if a war-weary public later found out that the government had a secret weapon that might have ended the war but refused to use it? They would have been run out of office.
- I once heard a government official of the time say that it was odd to hear people talking about the "decision" to bomb Hiroshima because there was not a decision to make. We were in a long, horrible, bloody war. We had a new weapon. It was going to be used.
- The Japanese were not showing a willingness to negotiate. Yes, some members of the Japanese state department were making peaceful overtures before Hiroshima, but they had no power. None of the military ruling clique was anywhere in the ballpark of surrendering. Even after Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and the Russian declaration of war, the government STILL would not have voted for surrender except for the absolutely extraordinary and unprecedented intervention of the Emperor. And even then, the military rulers were still trying to figure out how to suppress the Emperor or even take him hostage to stop any peace process.
- It is argued sometimes that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were irrelevant and that the Japanese surrendered when the Russians declared war. The Russian declaration was certainly an important part of the mix, but I find it hard to believe the Emperor would have taken his unprecedented actions without the atomic bomb attacks. Besides, even if the Russian declaration was critical, it could be argued the bombs played a huge role in that declaration. After all, we had tried to get the Russians to make such a declaration for years, and it suddenly came coincidentally a couple of days after the atomic bombs start dropping? I doubt it. A better theory is that the Russians were waiting for signs that the war was nearly won so they could jump in and grab some costless booty from defeated Japan, and the bombs were that sign.
- It is argued that the invasion of Japan would have cost fewer lives than the bomb. This is a crock. Sorry. There is absolutely no way to look at military and civilian casualty figures from Iwo Jima and Okinawa and come to any conclusion other than the fact that the invasion of Japan would have been a bloodbath.
- It is argued that we could have blockaded Japan to death. This is possible, but it would have 1. Taken a lot of time, for which no one had any patience; 2. exposed US ships to relentless Kamikaze attacks and 3. likely have cost more Japanese civilian lives to continued conventional bombing and starvation than the atomic bombs did.
- It is argued that we dropped the bombs on Japan out of some sort of racial hatred. We can't really test this since by the time the bombs were ready, Japan was our only enemy left in the field. Certainly, as a minimum, we had developed a deep hatred of Japanese culture that seemed so alien to us and led to atrocities that naturally generated a lot of hatred. For the soldier, the best simple description of this culture clash I ever heard (I can't remember the source) was a guy who said something like "for us, the war was about winning and going home. For the Japanese, the war just seemed to be about dying." In a time where racism was much more normal and accepted, I would say that yes, this cultural hatred became real racism. But I would add that it was not like we entered the war with some sort of deep, long hatred of Asians. If anything, we stumbled into the Pacific War in large part because Americans felt a special friendship and sympathy with China and would not accept Japan's military interventions there.
Rocochet asks this question over the weekend: What are your top 5 causes of the fall of the Roman Empire. OK, I will take a shot at this from my decidedly amateur perspective:
- Demographic collapse, caused by a series of plagues (perhaps even an Ur version of the black death) and possibly climate change (colder) that depopulated the western half of the empire
- A variety of policies (e.g. grain dole) that shifted population from productive farms to the cities. In the 19th century, this shift was to be growth-inducing as farm labor was moving into growing factories, but no such productivity revolution existed in Roman cities. The combination of #2 with #1 left huge swaths of farmland abandoned, and the Romans dependent on grain ships from North Africa to feed the unproductive mouths in large Italian cities. It also gutted the traditional Roman military model, which depended strongly on these local farmers for the backbone of the army.
- The Romans lost their ability to be innovative in including new peoples in their Empire. The Romans had a bewildering array of citizenship and tax statuses for different peoples who joined or were conquered by the empire. For hundreds of years, this innovation was hugely successful. But by the 4th and 5th centuries they seemed to have lost the trick. The evidence for this is that they could have solved multiple problems -- the barbarians at the gates and the abandonment of farm land and the need for more soldiers -- by finding a way to settle barbarians on empty farm land. This is in fact exactly what the barbarians wanted. That is why I do not include the barbarian invasions as one of my five, because it did not have to be barbarian invasions, it could have been barbarian immigration. Gibson's thesis was that Christianity killed the Roman Empire by making it "soft". I don't buy that, but it may have been that substituting the Romans' earlier incredible tolerance for other religions in their Pagan period with a more intolerant version of Christianity contributed to this loss of flexibility.
- Hand in hand with #3, the Roman economy became sclerotic. This was the legacy of Diocletian and Constantine, who restructured the empire to survive several centuries more but at the cost of at least an order of magnitude more state control in every aspect of society. Diocletian's edict of maximum prices is the best known such regulation, but in fact he fixed most every family into their then-current trades and insisted the family perform the same economic functions in all future generations. Essentially, it was Ayn Rand's directive 10-289 for the ancient world, and the only reason these laws were not more destructive is that the information and communication technologies of the time did not allow for very careful enforcement.
- Splits in the governance of the empire between west and east (again going back to Diocletian) reduced the ability to fund priorities on one side of the empire with resources from the other side. More specifically, the wealthy eastern empire had always subsidized defense of the west, and that subsidy became much harder, and effectively ended, in the century after Diocletian.
I will add, as a reminder, that to some extent this is all a trick question, because the Roman Empire really did not totally fall until the capture of Constantinople in 1453. So I should have stated at the outset that all of the above refers to the fall of the western empire in the late 5th century, which in part explains why #5 is there in the list.
And, if you were in a room of historians of this era, you could quickly get into an argument over whether the western Roman empire really fell in the late 5th century. For example, the Visigothic Kingdom in the area of modern southern France and Spain retained a lot of Roman practices and law. But I have gone with tradition here and dated the "fall" of the empire to 476 when the Roman Emperor was deposed and not replaced.
Apparently, it is Hamilton that will get the ax on the $10 bill rather than Jackson on the $20 in order to make way for some fresh historical faces. I am not the biggest Hamilton supporter in the world, and he was never a President, but he had as much to do with the form our Constitution takes today as any man in history. On the other hand, for whatever points Jackson might make with me by opposing the Bank of the United States, he was really a horrible person. His attitude about blacks and his treatment of slaves represented the worst of the slave-holding South, his his ruthless role in wiping out of the Cherokee nation is beyond criminal.
To this day, I don't know how the conflict between nomadic Native Americans and European settlers looking to build towns and farms could ever have had a happy ending. But the one exception to this was the Cherokee, who settled down in communities in Georgia that in most ways mirrored European communities in the rest of the early United States. If there are any native americans we should have been able to integrate into American society, it was the Cherokee. And we wiped them out. Awful. I would rather the $20 bill be blank than have that genocidal maniac on it.
PS- would love to see someone like Harriet Tubman on the money, or really anyone else whose contribution did not consist merely of exercising power over me. Hell, put Steve Jobs on there -- the iPad, and the Apple II before it, have improved my happiness more than any politician.
One of the hardest things to do in history is to read history in context, shutting out our foreknowledge of what is going to happen -- knowledge the players at the time did not have.
Apparently Neville Chamberlain is back in the public discourse, again raised from the dead as the boogeyman to scare us away from any insufficiently militaristic approach to international affairs.
There is no doubt that Neville Chamberlain sold out the Czechs at Munich, and the Munich agreement was shown to be a fraud on Hitler's part when he invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia just months later. In retrospect, we can weep at the lost opportunity as we now know, but no one knew then, that Hitler's generals planned a coup against him that was undermined by the Munich agreement.
But all that being said, let's not forget the historic context. World War I was a cataclysm for England and Europe. It was probably the worst thing to happen to Europe since the black death. And many learned folks at the time felt that this disaster had been avoidable (and many historians today might agree). They felt that there had been too much rush to war, and too little diplomacy. If someone like Britain had been more aggressive in dragging all the parties to the bargaining table in 1914, perhaps a European-wide war could have been avoided or at least contained to the Balkans.
There simply was no energy in 1938, no collective will to start another war. Even in France, which arguably had the most to lose from a reinvigorated Germany, the country simply could not face another war. As an illustration, one could argue that an even better and more logical time to "stop Hitler" occurred before Munich in March of 1936 when Hitler violated the Versailles Treaty and reoccupied the Rhineland with military forces. France had every right to oppose this occupation, and Hitler's generals said later that their forces were so puny at the time that the French could have stopped them with a brigade and sent them running back across the Rhine. And the French did nothing.
In addition, Britain and France had very little ability to do much about Hitler's ambitions in Eastern Europe anyway. How were they going to get troops to the Sudetenland? We saw later in Poland how little ability they had to do anything in Eastern Europe.
And finally, everyone was boxed in by having accepted Woodrow Wilson's formula of "self-determination of peoples." Building the entire post-war realignment on this shoddy building block is what really led to disaster. Emphasizing this essentially nationalist formulation as the fundamental moral principle of international relations -- rather than, say, the protection of individual rights of all peoples -- really empowered Hitler. In the Saarland, in the Rhineland, in Austria, and in the Sudetenland, it lent him the moral high ground. He was just fulfilling Wilson's formulation, wasn't he? These were all majority-German lands coming home to Germany.
Postscript: Years ago in my youth I used to excoriate FDR for caving into Stalin at Yalta, specifically in giving away most of Eastern Europe. I still wish he hadn't given his moral authority and approval to the move, but even if we stood on the table and screamed at Stalin in opposition, what were we going to do? Was there any appetite for extending the war? Zero. That is what folks who oppose the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan get wrong in suggesting there were alternatives. All those alternatives involved a longer war and more American deaths which no one wanted.
It is with mixed emotions that I greet this day. Frequent readers will know that I long for a system of much more open immigration. I don't think that the US Government should be limiting who can and cannot seek work or live within the US borders (setting rules for citizenship and receipt of benefits are different matters). So I would like to see many long-time immigrants legalized today (and in fact I likely have friends and acquaintances who will benefit, though it's always been a bit awkward to ask them about immigration status).
However, I would MUCH rather see a rational process implemented than these once a decade amnesties we seem to go in for instead.
I also worry that Obama is taking these actions for all the wrong reasons, seeking to add 5 million Democratic voters rather than trying to help 5 million people who are seeking prosperity. The reason I suspect this is that he is also seeking higher minimum wages that will likely make it harder for these folks to find work, likely something he has promised to his union allies so they won't freak out. I have always said that Republicans want immigrants to work but not vote and Democrats want immigrants to vote but not work.
But I am much more worried about the un-Constitutional process that is going to be followed. Of course, this is not the only Executive power grab over the last two presidencies, but it is a big one and one of the first where the President has admitted he doesn't have the power but is going to do it anyway.
Around 133BC, Tiberius Gracchus was ticked off that the Roman Republic would not consider necessary land reform. I am going to oversimplify here, but in their conquests the Romans had grabbed a lot of new territory and by law that land was supposed to be parceled in small sections to lots of individual land holders. Instead, powerful men (many of whom were in the Senate) grabbed the lion's share of this land for themselves in huge estates. Gracchus rightly saw this as unfair and a violation of law, but it was also a threat to the security of the nation, as independent landowners who bought their own weapons were the backbone of the Roman army. The shift of agriculture to huge estates staffed with slaves was not only forcing a shift in the makeup of the army (one which would by the way contribute to the rise of despotic generals like Sulla and Caeser), but also was creating social problems by throwing mobs of unlanded poor on the cities, particularly Rome.
Anyway, the short version is that Tiberius Gracchus had good reason to think these reforms were important. But traditionally they would have to be considered by the Senate first, and he was too impatient to wait that process out, and besides (probably rightly) feared the Senate would find a way to kill them. He was so passionate about them that he violated the (unwritten) Roman Constitution by ignoring the Senate and setting new precedents for using his position as Tribune to pass the new laws. It was absolutely the prototype for a well-intentioned bypassing of the Constitution. I won't go into detail, but Tiberius was killed at the behest of some Senators, but his brother picked up his mantle 10 years later and did some similar things. Which is why we talk of the Gracchi brothers.
In the near term, the results were some partial successes with land reform. However, in the long-term, their actions really got the ball rolling on what is called the Roman Revolution. A hundred years later, the Republic would be gone, replaced with a dictatorship. Step by step, the precedents often set initially with only the best intentions, were snatched up and used by demagogues to cement their own power. In later years, what gave emperors their authority was a package of powers granted to them. One of the most important was "tribunition" power. In essence, the tribunition power included many of the powers first exercised aggresively by the Gracchi brothers. More than just starting the ball rolling on the Revolution, they pioneered the use of powers that were to be the core of future emperors' authority.
A couple of quick thoughts on this map from this Vox article edited by Matt Yglesias
- I hate to diss my old cohorts at McKinsey, but isn't this entirely arbitrary to how you draw the map? If you made the map break in, say, the Atlantic Ocean with the Ivory Coast on the far left of the map and Newfoundland on the far right, won't this look different?
- People seem to want to get freaked out about China passing the US in terms of the size of its economy. But in the history of Civilization there have probably been barely 200 years in the last 4000 that China hasn't been the largest economy in the world. It probably only lost that title in the early 19th century and is just now getting it back. We are in some senses ending an unusual period, not starting one.
Over time, my understanding of the importance of the D-Day invasions has shifted. Growing up, I considered these events to be the single key event in defeating the Nazis. Listening to the radio this morning, this still seems to be the common understanding.
Over time, I have had to face the fact that the US (or at least the US Army) was not primarily responsible for defeating Germany -- the Russians defeated Germany, and what's more, would have defeated them whether the Allies had landed in France or not. Check out the casualties by front, from Wikipedia:
The Russians defeated Germany. Period. And I don't think the western allies would ever have had the stomach to inflict the kind of casualties on Germany that were ultimately necessary to defeat her without Russian help. To me, this is the great irony of WWII, that it was not ultimately a victory for democracy. Only totalitarian Russia could defeat totalitarian Germany. This thought often bothers me a lot. It doesn't fit with how we want to view the war.
However, D-Day did have an important effect -- it kept Western Europe out of Soviet hands. We did not know it at the time, but I would argue in retrospect that from mid-1944 on we were competing with Russia to see how Europe would get divided up after the war. D-Day allowed the western allies to overrun most of Western Europe and keep it out of Soviet hands, perhaps an even more important outcome than just speeding the defeat of the Germans. Sure, FDR gets grief for giving the farm away to Russia at Yalta, but what could he do? The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe at that point was a fait accompli. What would have been FDR & Churchill's negotiation position at Yalta if their armies were not even on the continent (excepting Italy, where we might still be fighting in 2014 and getting nowhere)?
Long time readers will know that if I were asked to relive my life doing something entirely different, I would like to try studying economic history. Today, in a bit of a coincidence, my son called me with a question about the effect of the Black Death in Europe on labor and grain prices ... just days after I had been learning about the exact same part of history in Professor Daileader's awesome Teaching Company course on the Middle Ages (actually he has three courses - early, high, late - which are all excellent).
From the beginning of the 14th century, Europe suffered a series of demographic disasters. Climate change in the form of the end of the Medieval warm period led to failed crops and several years of famine early in the century. Then, later in the century, the Black Death came... over and over, perhaps made worse by the fact that Europeans were weakened already from famine. As a result, the population of Europe dropped by something like half.
It is not entirely obvious to me what such a demographic disaster would do to prices. Panic and uncertainty usually drive them up in the near term, but what about after that? Both the supply and demand curves for most everything will be dropping in tandem. So what happens to prices?
In the case of the 14th century, we know the answer: the price of labor rose dramatically, while the price of grain dropped. The combination tended to bankrupt the landholding aristocracy, who went so far as to try to reimpose serfdom to get their finances back in balance (some things never change). The nobility pretty much failed at this in the West (England, France) and were met with a series of peasant revolts. They generally succeeded in the East (Germany, Poland, Russia) which is why a quasi-feudal agricultural system persisted so long in those countries.
But why? Why did grain price go down rather than up? Why did labor go in the opposite direction? I could look it up, but that is no fun.
A first answer, which does not satisfy
People who think of all of the middle ages as "the dark ages" miss the boom that occurred between 1000-1300. Population increased, and technology advanced (just because this technology seems pedestrian to us, like the plow harness for horses or the stirrup, does not make it any less so). It was the only time between about 300 and 1500 when the population was growing (a fact we climate skeptics will note coincided with the Medieval warm period).
But even without the setbacks of the 1300's, historians probably would argue that Europe was headed for a Malthusian collapse no matter what in the 14th century. An enormous amount of forest had been cleared and new farmland created, such that by 1300 some pretty marginal land was being farmed just so Europe could barely keep up with demand. At the margin, really low productivity land was being farmed.
So if there is a sudden 50% population cut, then that means that all that marginal farm land will be abandoned first. While the number of farmers would be cut in half, production would be reduced by less than half because presumably the least productive farms would be abandoned first. With demand cut by half and production cut by less than half, prices would fall for grain.
But this doesn't work for labor. The same argument should apply. To get everyone fed, we would actually need less than half the prior labor force because they would concentrate on the best land. Labor prices should fall in this model as well, but in fact they went up. A lot. In fact, they went up not by a few percent but by multiples, enough to cause enormous social problems across Europe.
A second answer, that makes more sense
After thinking about this for a while, I came to realize that I had the wrong model for the economy in my head. I was thinking about our modern economy. If suddenly, say, online retailing reduces demand for physical stores dramatically, people close stores and redeploy capital and labor and assets to other investments in other industries. That is how I was thinking about the Middle Ages.
But it may be more correct to see the Middle Ages as a one product economy. There was agriculture, period. Everything else was a rounding error.
So now let's think about the "farmers" in the Middle Ages. They are primarily all the 1%, the titled nobility, who either farm big estates with peasant labor or lease large parts of their estates to peasants for farming.
OK, half the population is suddenly gone. The Noble's family has lots of death but someone is still around to inherit. They have a big estate where growing grain supports their lifestyle as well as any military obligations they may have to their lord (though this style of fighting with knights on horseback supported by grants of land is having its last hurrah in the 100 years war).
Then grain prices collapse. That is a clear pricing signal. In the modern economy, that would tell us to get out and find a new place for our capital. So, as Lord Coyote of the Castle Aaaaargh, I am going to do what, exactly? How can I redeploy my capital, when it is essentially illiquid? I can't sell the family land. And if I did, land prices, along with grain prices and the demographic collapse, are falling through the floor. And even if I could sell for cash, what would I do for a living? What would I reinvest the money in? Running an estate is all I know. It's all anyone knows. I have to support myself and my 3 mistresses and my squires and my string of warhorses.
All I can do is try to farm the land I have always farmed. And everyone else does the same. The result is far more grain than anyone needs with the reduced population, so prices fall. But I still need the same number of people to grow the food, irregardless of the price it fetches, but there are now half as many workers available so the price of labor goes through the roof. When grain demand collapsed, there was no way to clear the excess capacity. It turns out everyone had a nearly vertical supply curve, because irregardless of price, they had nothing else they could do with their time and money. You can see now why they tried to solve their problem by reimposing serfdom (combined with price controls, a bad idea for Diocletian and for Nixon and everyone in between).
Of course, nothing is stuck forever. One way capacity cleared was through the growth of the bureaucratic state over the next 2 centuries. Nobles eventually had to find some new way to support themselves, and did so by taking jobs in growing state bureaucracies. They became salaried ministers rather than feudal knights supported by agriculture. At the same time, rising wealth among the 99% non-nobility allowed kings to support themselves through taxes rather than the granting of fiefs, which in turn paid for the nobility to take jobs in the bureaucracy and paid for peasant armies with guns and bows that replaced the lords fighting on horseback. So in the long term, the price signal was inordinately powerful -- so powerful it helped reshape much of European government and society.
By the way, if you are reading this expecting some point about modern politics, sorry. Just something I was thinking about and it helped to write it down. Comments are appreciated. I still have not cribbed the answer from the history texts yet.
Revisionism on the causes of WWI seems to ebb and flow like a 20-year clock. It was Germany's fault, no it wasn't, yes it was. Etc. Here is the latest iteration.
I have read quite a bit on the topic of late. It was horribly complex, but here are a few thoughts.
- At some level, it was everyone's fault, at least as measured by the enthusiasm that greeted the war in nearly every country. It was the last war begun by folks who thought it would be incredibly romantic and glorious.
- Austria simply has to bear a lot of the blame. No doubt a crisis in the Balkans could have been started by Russia or Serbia, and in an alternative universe where the Archduke was not assassinated, they might well have. But the fact is that Austria made this one happen. They crafted a set of demands on Serbia that were supposed to be unreasonable. They were meant to be a Casus Belli. Austria had determined it was going to war with Serbia.
- Much is made of the German blank check to Austria, but the key fact for me were the actions of Germany several weeks later. In response to a building crisis in the Balkans to their southeast, the Germans entered the war attacking to the northwest, into Belgium and France. With conflict inevitable in the Balkans, the Germans (with a helping hand from the Russians) helped turn a limited conflict into a World War.
The Germans were also responsible through bad decisions in bringing the US into the war, via a u-boat campaign that failed to achieve its goals (starve the Brits) but managed to bring US troops to Europe at almost the exact moment when British and French troops might have collapsed. Incredibly, the Germans made the exact same mistake in WWII, declaring war on the US so they could initiate a u-boat campaign against US shipping, when Congress might well have been happy to keep America's war limited to Japan.
I have been playing around with this DVD, which is a collection of high resolution situation maps from the European theater of war after D-Day in WWII. The maps are really interesting, though the interface is awful. Like something from the AOL era. I would play with this much more but it is just too kludgy.
This is probably my favorite map (click to enlarge)
Of course, on the very next day, the last great German attack on the Western Front came right out of that empty red circle.
In the software, one can zoom very deep into these maps, deeper than these images allow. So it's a shame that the interface is so bad.
PS - The Bulge is deservedly a part of American military mythology but we should remember that in many ways it was a small battle compared to any number in the East. This is one of those facts that always perplexes this libertarian, because there is no way the Western Democracies could have ever defeated Germany IMO. Only Stalin's willingness to soak up astounding losses really defeated Germany. German army casualties on the Eastern Front were nearly three times their combined casualties in Africa, Italy, France, and Benelux.
The flip side of this is that no one else other than the US could have defeated the Japanese, though again the Soviets would have given them real troubles in Manchuria. That war was more about projecting power across great distances than pure numbers. We did bravely soak up absurd casualties in short bursts. But again, the Russians were soaking up Bettio-level casualties every few hours, and sustained it day in and day out for years.
I have been taking a course in World War I, something I know little about relative to the rest of the 20th century.
We often think of WWI as a horrible, wasteful, pointless war that solved nothing and WWII as an expensive yet "good" war that achieved positive aims. But as we approach the 75th anniversary of the Munich conference, it is interesting to note that if you ask someone in Eastern Europe, you are likely to get the opposite answer. Most Eastern European countries can date their modern statehood from the end of WWI, while WWII led to 50+ years of Soviet subjugation. WWI was their good war.
Years ago I had an argument with my mother-in-law, who is a classic Massachusetts liberal (by the way, we get along fine -- I have no tolerance for the notion that one can't be friends with someone who has a different set of politics). The argument was very clarifying for me and centered around the notion of coercion.
I can't entirely remember what the argument was about, but I think it was over government-mandated retirement programs. Should the government be forcing one to save, and if so, should the government do the investment of those savings (ie as they do in Social Security) even if this means substantially lower returns on investment?
The interesting part was we both used the word "arrogant." I said it was arrogant for a few people in government to assume they could make better decisions for individuals. She said it was arrogant for me to assume that all those individuals out there had the same training and capability that I had to be able to make good decisions for themselves.
And at the end of the day, that is essentially the two sides of the argument over government paternalism boiled down to its core. I thought coercion was immoral, she thought letting unprepared people make sub-optimal decisions for themselves when other people know better is immoral. As with most of my one on one arguments I have with people, I left it at that. When I argue face to face with real people, I have long ago given up trying to change their minds and generally settle for being clear where our premises diverge.
I am reminded of all this reading Bruce McQuain's take on Sarah Conly's most recent attempt to justify coercive paternalism (the latter is not an unfair title I have saddled her with -- it's from her last book). Reading this I had a couple of other specific thoughts
- I am amazed how much Conly and folks like her can write this stuff without addressing the fundamental contradiction at its core -- if we are so bad making decisions for ourselves, why do we think the same human beings suddenly become good at it when they join government? She would argue, I guess, that there are a subset of super-humans who are able to do what most of us can't, but how in a democracy do we thinking-impaired people know to vote for one of the supermen? Or if you throw our democracy, what system has ever existed that selected for leaders who make good decisions for the peasants vs., say, selected for people who were good generals.
- Is there any difference between Conly's coercive paternalism and Kipling's white man's burden? Other than the fact that the supermen and the mass of sub-optimizing schlubs are not differentiated by race? It's fascinating to see Progressives who are traditionally energized by hatred of colonialism rejuvinating one of imperialism's core philosophical justifications.
I thought this was an interesting article on Harry Dexter White, an important American architect of the post-war monetary system who spied for the Soviets for over a decade. The one disconnect I had was this:
Over the course of 11 years, beginning in the mid-1930s, White acted as a Soviet mole, giving the Soviets secret information and advice on how to negotiate with the Roosevelt administration and advocating for them during internal policy debates. White was arguably more important to Soviet intelligence than Alger Hiss, the U.S. State Department official who was the most famous spy of the early Cold War.
The truth about White's actions has been clear for at least 15 years now, yet historians remain deeply divided over his intentions and his legacy, puzzled by the chasm between White's public views on political economy, which were mainstream progressive and Keynesian, and his clandestine behavior on behalf of the Soviets. Until recently, the White case has resembled a murder mystery with witnesses and a weapon but no clear motive.
Only in academia could folks see a "chasm" between admiration for the Soviets and an American progressive who grew up a supporter of Robert La Follette and later of the New Deal. The problem, I think, is that White seems to have shared the gauzy positive view of Soviet economic progress and success that was also rooted deeply in American academia (not to mention the NY Times). I don't know what the academic situation is like today, but as recently as 1983, for example, I had a professor at Princeton who went nuts at the mere mention of Hannah Arendt's name, apparently for the crime of lumping Stalin's communism in with Hitler's fascism as two sides of the same totalitarian coin.
In today's history lesson, we have something called the "Addled Parliament." Surely that cannot be a good name to have, and in fact the name was given as a term of derision, very like how the Left describes the current Congress as obstructionist and ineffectual.
So why did it gain the name "addled"? It turns out, for about the same reasons the current Congress comes under derision from Obama: It did not give the King all the money he wanted. Via Wikipedia:
The Addled Parliament was the second Parliament of England of the reign of James I of England (following his 1604-11 Parliament), which sat between 5 April and 7 June 1614. Its name alludes to its ineffectiveness: it lasted no more than eight weeks and failed to resolve the conflict between the king, who wished to raise money in the form of a 'Benevolence', a grant of £65,000 and the House of Commons (who were resisting further taxation). It was dissolved by the king.
Parliament also saw no reason for a further grant. They had agreed to raise £200,000 per annum as part of the Great Contract and as the war with Spain had reached its resolution with the 1604 Treaty of London, they saw the King's continued financial deficit as a result of his extravagance (especially on Scottish favourites such as Robert Carr) and saw no justification for continued high spending.
Moreover there remained the continuing hostility as a result of the kings move of setting impositions without consulting Parliament.
Wow, none of that sounds familiar, huh? In fact, James was an awful spendthrift. Henry the VII was fiscally prudent. Henry the VIII was a train wreck. Elizabeth was a cheapskate but got into expensive wars, particularly in her declining years, and handed out too many government monopolies to court favorites. But James came in and bested the whole lot, tripling Elizabeth's war time spending in peace time, mainly to lavish wealth on family and court favorites, and running up debt over 3x annual government receipts. History, I think, pretty clearly tells us that Parliament was absolutely correct to challenge James on spending and taxes, and given that it took another century, a civil war, a Glorious Revolution, a regal head removal, and a lot of other light and noise to finally sort this issue out, it should not be surprising that this pioneering Parliament failed. Yet we call it "addled".
The story I was always taught is that the Spanish conquistadors rolled over the Aztecs, Maya, and Incas in what would be an inevitable victory chalked up to guns, germs, and steel. But I always found this conclusion a bit smelly. Sure the Spanish had guns and horses, but they didn't have very many of them (a few hundred) and they were not very good. Three and a half centuries later, the US struggled at times in its wars with North American tribes (just ask the Custer family) despite having FAR better guns, many more trained troops (just after the Civil War), numerical superiority rather than inferiority, and a much better logistics situation (land access by rail vs. sea access by wooden boat). In addition, Latin American civilizations faced by the Spanish were better organized, far more numerous, and technologically more advanced than plains Indians. So why the seemingly easy victory by the Spanish?
Apparently there is a new book discussing this topic, which claims the results were much more contingent than commonly believed.
The “steel and germs” explanation for the rapidity of conquest has not convinced all specialists. The newcomers’ technological advantages were insufficient and in any case only temporary; differential mortality was a long-term process, not something that happened at the moment of outsiders’ assault. Thinking about the endemic vulnerabilities of empires helps us understand the situation. The Aztecs and the Incas were themselves imperial formations of relatively recent origin, with highly concentrated power and wealth at the center and often violent relations with not entirely assimilated people at the edges of their empires. When the Europeans arrived, indigenous people were not sure whether the newcomers were enemies, gods, or evil spirits–or potentially useful allies against an oppressive power. These uncertainties made it harder for their rulers, who had no way of knowing what was in store for them, to respond effectively. Cortes and Pizarro recruited allies among disaffected peoples, thereby making their armies as large as the Aztec and Inca forces they fought against. The battle against the Aztecs was hard-fought, with Spaniards suffering reverses, despite their indigenous allies and the hesitations of the Aztec emperor Moctezuma. The conquest of the Inca empire–more centralized than that of the Aztecs–was also facilitated by turning those excluded under Inca power into indigenous allies.
Last week I mentioned that my dad had passed away. I had not really meant to make a big deal about it on my blog, but I wanted to give my support for the oral history idea. However, a lot of you expressed support and condolences, for which I am thankful, and were curious about my dad from some of the small references I dropped. I didn't answer any of the friendly requests I got for information, mainly because dad was so private about his life and accomplishments that it seemed odd for me to do anything but the same. But his obituary appeared this weekend in the Houston paper so I thought I would share that for those who are interested.
Glenn Reynolds links to an article on oral histories. In 8th grade, my son had to do an oral history of someone in my family. I bought him an mp3 recorder, one of those little dictation things they sell at Staples or Office Depot, and he recorded about 4 hours of interviews.
My dad passed away last week, but due to dementia lost the ability to discuss his life long before that. My dad had an amazing life, growing up in a tiny house in Depression-era Iowa and eventually running one of the largest corporations in the world. He never talked about himself. Knowing him, one couldn't imagine him writing a memoir. In a day where executives hire PR agents to puff them up in the press, my dad scoffed and derided the practice. He bought all his casual clothes at Sears until his teenage daughters made him stop.
So the only history we have of him in his own words wouldn't exist if a wonderful teacher hadn't assigned him the project.
you make the call -- mushroom cloud atom bomb cake for some sort of military function in 1946.
Update: I looked at it again. Someone please tell me this is not their wedding cake.
This advertisement from the 1970's is a fail on so many levels that it is just hilarious. Using the Shah of Iran as you source of moral authority? Cheer-leading the Iranian nuclear program? Awesome. Via How to be a Retronaut
I had never seen Ansel Adams series of photos from a US internment camp for Japanese-Americans during WWII. I had mixed feelings about them. Adams said that he wanted to portray the resiliency of those imprisoned, showing how they made the best of a bad situation. And certainly I have great respect for that, and the cultural strengths we see at work are a prelude to how Japan itself was rebuilt after the devastation of WWII.
But at another level I find these photos incredibly creepy. They look too much like the fake photos staged by Germans and Russians of various eras to airbrush the horrors of their concentration camps. I am willing to believe we Americans were better jailers, but none-the-less I was disturbed that these looked a lot like propaganda photos.
This is kind of cool -- evidence of European settlers along the US eastern coast 19,000-26,000 years ago.
Part of the story involves changing sea levels and Arctic ice extents. These things change without fossil fuels? Who knew?
This is actually the inside of the White House during the Truman Administration. I had realized it was "renovated", but I think I pictured something less dramatic. It appears the place was totally gutted.
Jackalope Pursuivant takes off from my post yesterday about Pearl Harbor. If I were to give it a theme, I would call it "shock of the new." From time to time folks, for example in the military, may say that they understand a new technology, but the fact that a few smart staff officers "get it" does not mean that the military has really adjusted itself to it. Like any large organization, it has a culture and set of expectations and people who have been successful based on the old model of things. They may say they understand that naval aviation has changed things, but they don't really adjust themselves until Pearl Harbor and Clark Field and Guam and Singapore are full of smoking ruins of planes and ships.
Dan's observation about how quickly the US dusted itself off and recognized that the world had changed is a good one. One could argue that no one did this in WWI. The Europeans had every chance to see what the machine gun could do even before the war in a few African wars. Heck, the final year of the American Civil War around Petersberg was a preview of WWI, as was the ill-fated charge of the light brigade. But armies were still dominated by cavalries and plumed hats and bayonet charges and elan vital. Even in 1916 and 1917, when they should have learned their lesson, commanders were still obsessed with making full frontal charges. The Americans had the chance to watch the war for four years before they entered, and then promptly began committing the exact same mistakes based on the exact same faulty assumptions as in 1914. (Neal Stephenson has a great take on American flexibility to craft radically new combat doctrine based on new facts in WWII in Cryptonomicon, absolutely one of my favorite books).
As for Pearl Harbor, I am reminded of a quote that was attributed to Frank Borman (at least in the From the Earth to the Moon documentary) when he was testifying about the Apollo 1 fire. He called it "a failure of imagination" -- no one was even thinking about danger on the ground, all the focus was on space. At the end of the day, the ultimate answer for Pearl Harbor's negligence in readiness was a failure of imagination. They may have had war games and studies discussing Pearl Harbor attacks, and they may have addressed the possibility intellectually, but no one in command really believed that a couple of hundred aircraft would suddenly appear over peacetime Honolulu dropping bombs and torpedoes.