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	<title>Comments on: Dale Franks on the Bailout</title>
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	<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html</link>
	<description>Dispatches from a Small Business</description>
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		<title>By: Methinks</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13948</link>
		<dc:creator>Methinks</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 17:14:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13948</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;I believe that Merrill Lynch was forced to accept 0.22 on the dollar for its paper, which is a pretty brutal loss.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But probably a fair price.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;We already know that the default rate on most of the MBS paper will be around 5%, with a maximum of probably no more than 10%&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;No, we don&#039;t.  You can&#039;t have it both ways - either the MBSs are too opaque to calculate default rates with such accuracy or they aren&#039;t too opaque to calculate expected default rates with reasonable accuracy and everyone should stop bitching about the opacity of MBSs.  Which is it?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If it&#039;s the former, it&#039;s unlikely that government numbskulls running the world&#039;s largest distressed debt hedge fund, bankrolled by taxpayers to whom they are not accountable, will be able to figure out that they are buying the riskiest, most overpriced crap.  If it&#039;s the latter, then every distressed debt hedge fund will be bidding for those assets and we don&#039;t need Paulson&#039;s team of government morons to do it for us.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We&#039;re screwed - and that&#039;s my optimistic prediction.&lt;/p&gt;

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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>I believe that Merrill Lynch was forced to accept 0.22 on the dollar for its paper, which is a pretty brutal loss.</i></p>
<p>But probably a fair price.  </p>
<p><i>We already know that the default rate on most of the MBS paper will be around 5%, with a maximum of probably no more than 10%</i></p>
<p>No, we don&#8217;t.  You can&#8217;t have it both ways &#8211; either the MBSs are too opaque to calculate default rates with such accuracy or they aren&#8217;t too opaque to calculate expected default rates with reasonable accuracy and everyone should stop bitching about the opacity of MBSs.  Which is it?</p>
<p>If it&#8217;s the former, it&#8217;s unlikely that government numbskulls running the world&#8217;s largest distressed debt hedge fund, bankrolled by taxpayers to whom they are not accountable, will be able to figure out that they are buying the riskiest, most overpriced crap.  If it&#8217;s the latter, then every distressed debt hedge fund will be bidding for those assets and we don&#8217;t need Paulson&#8217;s team of government morons to do it for us.  </p>
<p>We&#8217;re screwed &#8211; and that&#8217;s my optimistic prediction.</p>
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		<title>By: Methinks</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13947</link>
		<dc:creator>Methinks</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 14:06:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13947</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;epo, ABSs have been around for a very long time and work very well.  MBSs are simply ABSs which are backed by mortgages and have been around for at least 30 years or so.  They work well and there&#039;s nothing wrong with MBSs per se.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The problem is the loose lending standards and undeserved high credit ratings.  The ABS is only as good as its underlying assets.  Recently, the loans comprise the underlying assets of the MBSs worth a lot less because they lever people more than we could dream of levering LTCM in the 90&#039;s and because there was virtually no due diligence done on borrowers.  That&#039;s the basic problem, not the ABSs - MBS or otherwise.  Credit card ABSs, for example are working well.  However, credit cards haven&#039;t loosened their lending standards as much and they still stick to arcane rules like actually doing credit checks on prospective borrowers [/sarcasm].&lt;/p&gt;

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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>epo, ABSs have been around for a very long time and work very well.  MBSs are simply ABSs which are backed by mortgages and have been around for at least 30 years or so.  They work well and there&#8217;s nothing wrong with MBSs per se.</p>
<p>The problem is the loose lending standards and undeserved high credit ratings.  The ABS is only as good as its underlying assets.  Recently, the loans comprise the underlying assets of the MBSs worth a lot less because they lever people more than we could dream of levering LTCM in the 90&#8242;s and because there was virtually no due diligence done on borrowers.  That&#8217;s the basic problem, not the ABSs &#8211; MBS or otherwise.  Credit card ABSs, for example are working well.  However, credit cards haven&#8217;t loosened their lending standards as much and they still stick to arcane rules like actually doing credit checks on prospective borrowers [/sarcasm].</p>
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		<title>By: bbartlog</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13946</link>
		<dc:creator>bbartlog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 13:54:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13946</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;We already know that the default rate on most of the MBS paper will be around 5%, with a maximum of probably no more than 10%&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I think epobirs has pointed out one problem with this idea: because of the bundling of mortgages into synthetic packages, we see a problem of asymmetric information. I could readily imagine that *some* of the mortgage-backed securities out there are toxic garbage, based on semi-fraudulent housing valuations or deliberate sorting of loan quality into different tranches - and those securities sure as hell won&#039;t have the 75 to 90% face value that they should. If sellers can&#039;t readily figure out which offerings are which, they won&#039;t buy (classic &#039;market for lemons&#039; problem).&lt;br /&gt;
Of course as you pointed out the expectation of a bailout also discourages sellers from pricing low enough to move their paper in spite of this problem. I believe that Merrill Lynch was forced to accept 0.22 on the dollar for its paper, which is a pretty brutal loss.&lt;/p&gt;

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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>We already know that the default rate on most of the MBS paper will be around 5%, with a maximum of probably no more than 10%</i></p>
<p>I think epobirs has pointed out one problem with this idea: because of the bundling of mortgages into synthetic packages, we see a problem of asymmetric information. I could readily imagine that *some* of the mortgage-backed securities out there are toxic garbage, based on semi-fraudulent housing valuations or deliberate sorting of loan quality into different tranches &#8211; and those securities sure as hell won&#8217;t have the 75 to 90% face value that they should. If sellers can&#8217;t readily figure out which offerings are which, they won&#8217;t buy (classic &#8216;market for lemons&#8217; problem).<br />
Of course as you pointed out the expectation of a bailout also discourages sellers from pricing low enough to move their paper in spite of this problem. I believe that Merrill Lynch was forced to accept 0.22 on the dollar for its paper, which is a pretty brutal loss.</p>
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		<title>By: bbartlog</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13945</link>
		<dc:creator>bbartlog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 13:54:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13945</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;We already know that the default rate on most of the MBS paper will be around 5%, with a maximum of probably no more than 10%&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I think epobirs has pointed out one problem with this idea: because of the bundling of mortgages into synthetic packages, we see a problem of asymmetric information. I could readily imagine that *some* of the mortgage-backed securities out there are toxic garbage, based on semi-fraudulent housing valuations or deliberate sorting of loan quality into different tranches - and those securities sure as hell won&#039;t have the 75 to 90% face value that they should. If sellers can&#039;t readily figure out which offerings are which, they won&#039;t buy (classic &#039;market for lemons&#039; problem).&lt;br /&gt;
Of course as you pointed out the expectation of a bailout also discourages sellers from pricing low enough to move their paper in spite of this problem. I believe that Merrill Lynch was forced to accept 0.22 on the dollar for its paper, which is a pretty brutal loss.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>We already know that the default rate on most of the MBS paper will be around 5%, with a maximum of probably no more than 10%</i></p>
<p>I think epobirs has pointed out one problem with this idea: because of the bundling of mortgages into synthetic packages, we see a problem of asymmetric information. I could readily imagine that *some* of the mortgage-backed securities out there are toxic garbage, based on semi-fraudulent housing valuations or deliberate sorting of loan quality into different tranches &#8211; and those securities sure as hell won&#8217;t have the 75 to 90% face value that they should. If sellers can&#8217;t readily figure out which offerings are which, they won&#8217;t buy (classic &#8216;market for lemons&#8217; problem).<br />
Of course as you pointed out the expectation of a bailout also discourages sellers from pricing low enough to move their paper in spite of this problem. I believe that Merrill Lynch was forced to accept 0.22 on the dollar for its paper, which is a pretty brutal loss.</p>
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		<title>By: epobirs</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13944</link>
		<dc:creator>epobirs</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 23:19:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13944</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Methinks, look at the essential problem behind this supposed crisis. The toxic items cannot be moved because they cannot be priced. Why do you suppose that is? Anybody with a mortgage should be able to tell you almost instantly the approximate value of their mortgage. That is, the payoff amount. It isn&#039;t until you bundle up a pile of mortgages, let them change hands several times, then treat them as the basis of financial instruments that aren&#039;t the mortgages themselves but still rely on the mortgages for their value, well, it doesn&#039;t take long before it all becomes play money with made-up numbers in the equation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If a believable market value cannot be assigned to these items, then they are worth NOTHING. Game over, thanks for playing. The failed financial companies should not be propped up. The only thing that matters is the depositors&#039; funds. Let the foreclosed properties be seized and auctioned off for dirt cheap (many of these are so dilapidated they can only be valued by the land minus the cost of removing the structures so the buyer can start anew) with the proceeds going to the FDIC to protect the consumers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;People need to get over the fallacious belief that this can all be fixed with the stroke of a congressional pen. There is some seriously broken stuff that is completely FUBAR. You can&#039;t get on with the cleanup until you accept that a bunch of stuff is lost and not coming back. Get rid of the market distorting nonsense like the CRA and get on with a life based on the world as it is rather than the world as it should be in socialists&#039; dreams.&lt;/p&gt;

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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Methinks, look at the essential problem behind this supposed crisis. The toxic items cannot be moved because they cannot be priced. Why do you suppose that is? Anybody with a mortgage should be able to tell you almost instantly the approximate value of their mortgage. That is, the payoff amount. It isn&#8217;t until you bundle up a pile of mortgages, let them change hands several times, then treat them as the basis of financial instruments that aren&#8217;t the mortgages themselves but still rely on the mortgages for their value, well, it doesn&#8217;t take long before it all becomes play money with made-up numbers in the equation.</p>
<p>If a believable market value cannot be assigned to these items, then they are worth NOTHING. Game over, thanks for playing. The failed financial companies should not be propped up. The only thing that matters is the depositors&#8217; funds. Let the foreclosed properties be seized and auctioned off for dirt cheap (many of these are so dilapidated they can only be valued by the land minus the cost of removing the structures so the buyer can start anew) with the proceeds going to the FDIC to protect the consumers.</p>
<p>People need to get over the fallacious belief that this can all be fixed with the stroke of a congressional pen. There is some seriously broken stuff that is completely FUBAR. You can&#8217;t get on with the cleanup until you accept that a bunch of stuff is lost and not coming back. Get rid of the market distorting nonsense like the CRA and get on with a life based on the world as it is rather than the world as it should be in socialists&#8217; dreams.</p>
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		<title>By: Methinks</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13943</link>
		<dc:creator>Methinks</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 22:42:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13943</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;The whole concept of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) has always struck me as trouble waiting to happen, ever since I read &#039;Liar&#039;s Poker.&#039;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Why?&lt;/p&gt;

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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>The whole concept of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) has always struck me as trouble waiting to happen, ever since I read &#8216;Liar&#8217;s Poker.&#8217;</i></p>
<p>Why?</p>
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		<title>By: epobirs</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13942</link>
		<dc:creator>epobirs</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 22:17:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13942</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Bobby, the CRA is the root of the problem, this is true. But there were choices made that took a bad situation and made it immensely worse. The whole concept of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) has always struck me as trouble waiting to happen, ever since I read &#039;Liar&#039;s Poker.&#039; Combine MBS and sub-prime mortgages, which are guaranteed to have a high failure rate, and you&#039;ve got a disaster looming in regulatory action doesn&#039;t constrain how deeply invested companies become in this idiocy.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The alarm has been raised repeatedly from the right and the left squelched it every time until we got to where we are now. If the general public could be made to understand how this is almost entirely the product of the left&#039;s policies there would be a mass evacuation of left-held seats and not a chance in hell of Obama being elected dogcatcher. But most people aren&#039;t interested if the 6:00 News doesn&#039;t tell them who the bad guys are in simple language that doesn&#039;t ask them to really think. Not that the average news broadcast will even give a hint that something called CRA might be part of this story.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bobby, the CRA is the root of the problem, this is true. But there were choices made that took a bad situation and made it immensely worse. The whole concept of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) has always struck me as trouble waiting to happen, ever since I read &#8216;Liar&#8217;s Poker.&#8217; Combine MBS and sub-prime mortgages, which are guaranteed to have a high failure rate, and you&#8217;ve got a disaster looming in regulatory action doesn&#8217;t constrain how deeply invested companies become in this idiocy.</p>
<p>The alarm has been raised repeatedly from the right and the left squelched it every time until we got to where we are now. If the general public could be made to understand how this is almost entirely the product of the left&#8217;s policies there would be a mass evacuation of left-held seats and not a chance in hell of Obama being elected dogcatcher. But most people aren&#8217;t interested if the 6:00 News doesn&#8217;t tell them who the bad guys are in simple language that doesn&#8217;t ask them to really think. Not that the average news broadcast will even give a hint that something called CRA might be part of this story.</p>
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		<title>By: John Moore</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13941</link>
		<dc:creator>John Moore</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 21:12:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13941</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;As I understand it, CRA had a larger effect than it might appear. Threats against institutions that didn&#039;t look good a la CRA reported coerced a lot of lending.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As I understand it, CRA had a larger effect than it might appear. Threats against institutions that didn&#8217;t look good a la CRA reported coerced a lot of lending.</p>
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		<title>By: Methinks</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13940</link>
		<dc:creator>Methinks</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:23:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13940</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Bobby,&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It was some choice, some government mandates (like the CRA), some lulling into a false sense of security by the existence of Fan &amp; Fred.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Credit spreads tightened across the board on all loans.  That part was choice.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bobby,</p>
<p>It was some choice, some government mandates (like the CRA), some lulling into a false sense of security by the existence of Fan &#038; Fred.</p>
<p>Credit spreads tightened across the board on all loans.  That part was choice.</p>
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		<title>By: bobby b</title>
		<link>http://www.coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html/comment-page-1#comment-13939</link>
		<dc:creator>bobby b</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 19:09:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://coyote-blog.com/wordpress/2008/09/dale-franks-on.html#comment-13939</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Talk of incompetent banks, all of whom made free-will choices, seems at odds with the prevailing theme I&#039;ve been hearing all along - that banks got stuck buying bad mortgage paper because of the pressures put on them by the CRA.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Is that untrue?  Was this all a simple matter of choice?  (Screwed-up choice, I mean, but still just a choice?&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Talk of incompetent banks, all of whom made free-will choices, seems at odds with the prevailing theme I&#8217;ve been hearing all along &#8211; that banks got stuck buying bad mortgage paper because of the pressures put on them by the CRA.</p>
<p>Is that untrue?  Was this all a simple matter of choice?  (Screwed-up choice, I mean, but still just a choice?</p>
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